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Abstract
We study a model of elections in non-majoritarian systems that captures the link
between competition in policies and competition in campaign spending. We argue that
the overall competitiveness of the political arena depends both on the endogenous number
of parties contesting the election and the endogenous level of campaign spending. These
two dimensions are linked together through their combined effect on the total equilibrium
level of political rents. We illustrate the key insights of the model through the analysis
of two major electoral institutions: campaign spending limits and compulsory voting. In
particular, we show that under some conditions spending caps and compulsory voting
can be pro-competitive, leading to an increase in the number of parties contesting the
elections.
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1 Introduction
Non-majoritarian electoral systems create a link between the degree of ideological differ-
entiation among parties competing for votes, and the incentives of new parties to enter
the political arena. Parties that represent policies that are too far apart from one another
invite the entry of new competitors, who seek to attract the niche of voters that do not
find any of the options available to be particularly appealing. This link is well known
in the literature: there is little hope of thinking about representation and ideological
differentiation in non-majoritarian elections without letting the number of parties adjust
freely in equilibrium.1 This, however, is only part of the story.
While parties’ ideological positions are surely important in shaping citizens’ voting
decisions, a paramount ingredient of modern day elections is the campaign competition
between parties, and the costs that are associated with it. Parties and candidates spend
heavily in electoral campaigns to change voters’ impressions about them, and their effort
pays off: campaign spending sways votes (Green and Krasno (1988), Kenny and McBur-
nett (1994), Gerber (1998), Coleman and Manna (2000), Stratmann (2009)), and induces
would-be voters to participate in the election (Gerber and Green (2000), Rekkas (2007)).
The key point here is not just that campaign competition is important in modern
elections – it is – but that a partial equilibrium analysis of campaign spending is not
called for either. Since voters and vote shares are more responsive to differentials in
campaign spending between two parties the more similar their policy positions are, a
smaller differentiation in policies leads to more intense campaign competition, and then
to higher costs of running the campaign in equilibrium. As a result, the effective size of
the cake (i.e. total political rents) shrinks, and so does the number of parties that can
be supported in equilibrium.
∗Mattozzi acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation, SES-0617901.
†Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California
91125, USA, emails: miaryc@hss.caltech.edu, andrea@hss.caltech.edu
1See Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2009).
In this paper, we introduce a model that captures the link between competition in
policies and competition in campaign spending. We illustrate the key insights of the
model through the analysis of two major electoral institutions: campaign finance limits
(or spending caps)2, and compulsory voting. Our analysis brings to light the common
effects of these two rather different electoral institutions on the competitiveness of the
political arena: under some conditions, both spending caps and compulsory voting can
lead to an increase in the number of parties contesting the elections. The key insight
of the paper is that the overall competitiveness of the political arena depends both on
the endogenous number of parties contesting the election and the endogenous level of
campaign competition. Our model shows that these two dimensions are linked together
through their combined effect on the total equilibrium level of political rents.
In the first part of the paper we analyze the effect of spending caps on equilibrium
outcomes assuming that voting is compulsory. We show that increasing the spending cap
leads (eventually) to a smaller number of parties, reducing the set of alternatives available
to voters. In fact, increasing the spending cap can eliminate competition altogether.
Thus, while relaxing the spending cap can increase the competitiveness of the campaign
for the parties that participate in the election, it can also reduce the number of parties
that enter the competition, and thus also competition in the ideological dimension.
Our results might suggest that if voters become more responsive to campaigning -
thus inducing parties to engage in a more intense campaign competition - the equilibrium
number of parties should be smaller as well. We show that this is not necessarily the
case. In particular, we provide sufficient conditions for equilibrium that are determined
by “supply-side” factors only; i.e., the variable cost of campaigning at the spending cap,
or the fixed cost of entry into the electoral competition. The responsiveness of voters to
campaigning plays no role in defining the number of parties that can be competing for
votes in equilibrium.
In the second part of the paper, we allow citizens to abstain from voting in the
context of a standard pivotal-voter theory of turnout. We focus on how ideological
polarization and campaign competition affect individuals’ decisions of whether to vote
at all or not, and on how the possibility of abstention affects parties’ incentives to spend
in campaigning. We first show that in an equilibrium with two parties, an increase in
polarization increases turnout and decreases campaign spending. We also show, however,
that the possibility of abstention has no direct effect on campaign spending. In other
words, in a two-party equilibrium, abstention is incentive-neutral. This is partly due to
the fact that individuals who choose to abstain must be locally centrist : they must have
ideal policies around that of the individual who is indifferent between the two parties.
We then show that these conclusions do not generally extend to multiparty equilibria.
In particular, the two-party logic breaks down in the multiparty setting because absten-
2As Prat (2002) puts it, “In principle one may restrict [campaign contributions] or [campaign spend-
ing], or both. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that limits on spending are unconstitutional because
they restrict the right to free speech. In contrast, limits on spending are in place in most European
countries.”
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tion has a global effect on representation. With two parties, abstention only transfers
power from one party to the other. With more than two parties, the decision of whether
to abstain or not affects the vote share of all parties competing for votes, independently
of their position in the ideological spectrum. Since abstention has global effects, the
entire profile of ideological positions represented by parties running for office becomes
relevant. As a result of this, with multiple parties voters’ abstention becomes generically
non neutral for campaign incentives. We illustrate this in the context of an equilibrium
with three parties. We show that in any such equilibrium, at least one party spends more
in campaigning when voting is voluntary and costly than when it is compulsory or cost-
less. Furthermore, we show that if the polarization and asymmetry of parties’ ideological
positions are sufficiently large, then all parties spend more resources in campaigning
when voting is voluntary and costly than when it is costless or compulsory.
Our results highlight the importance of looking at total political rents – and their effect
on the competitiveness of elections – when evaluating institutions designed to regulate
political competition.
This paper builds on a large literature, touching on each of the components of the
model. A number of influential papers study elections in majoritarian and proportional
systems. Myerson (1993) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001) focus on how the nature of elec-
toral competition affects promises of redistribution made by candidates in the election.
Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Baron and Diermeier (2001), Austen-Smith (2000),
Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2003), and Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2006) con-
sider models of elections and legislative outcomes in proportional representation systems
were rational voters anticipate the effect of their vote on the bargaining game between
parties in the elected legislature. They do this in the context of a fixed number of par-
ties (and without introducing campaign competition). Palfrey (1984, 1989), Feddersen,
Sened, and Wright (1990), Feddersen (1992), Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and
Coate (1997), and Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2009) introduce entry in elections. With
few exceptions (Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2009)), these
papers work in the context of plurality elections.3
A second strand of literature deals with the campaign competition dimension. In our
paper we formalize campaign competition as differentiation in a common value dimen-
sion. This builds on the large literature that, following Stokes (1963)’s original critique
to the Downsian model, incorporates competition in valence issues (typically within ma-
joritarian electoral systems, and two exogenously given parties). See Groseclose (2001),
Aragones and Palfrey (2002), and Berndardt, Camara, and Squintani (2009) for models
where one party has an exogenous valence advantage. For models of endogenous va-
lence see Carrillo and Castanheira (2006), Meirowitz (2007), Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita (2007), Eyster and Kittsteiner (2007), Callander (2008), and Herrera, Levine,
and Martinelli (2008).
3For models of differentiation and entry in industrial organization, see ?, ?, and ?.
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Finally, for formal models of abstention with costly voting, see Ledyard (1984), Pal-
frey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985), Bo¨rgers (2004), Krasa and Polborn (2009), and Taylor
and Yildirim (2009) (see also Krishna and Morgan (2009) in a common value setting).
One common feature of this literature is that only two policy alternatives/parties are
considered. Furthermore, it abstracts from the effect of campaign spending on individual
turnout decisions.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section
3 we characterize equilibria of the model with a focus on the analysis of spending caps.
We do this in the context of costless/compulsory voting. In Section 4 we introduce costly
voting and the possibility of abstention.
2 The Model
There are three stages in the game. In the first stage, a finite set of political parties
simultaneously decide whether or not to participate in the election. In the second stage,
all parties simultaneously choose a level of campaign spending. In the third stage, a finite
set of voters vote.
For given T , define the ideology space X ≡ {t/T : t = 0, 1, . . . , T} ⊂ [0, 1]. In
any x ∈ X there is a party who will perfectly represent policy x if elected.5 Parties
care about the spoils they can appropriate from being in office, and must pay a fixed
cost F to participate in the election. We denote the set of parties at the end of the
first stage by K = {1, . . . , K}. In the second stage, all parties contesting the election
simultaneously choose a level of campaign spending θk, which cannot exceed a spending
cap L; i.e., θk ∈ [0, L]. Parties can spend θk at a cost Cv(θk), Cv(·) increasing and
convex. In the third stage, N fully strategic voters vote in an election, where we think as
N being a large finite number. A voter i with ideal point zi ∈ X ranks parties according
to the utility function u(·; zi), which assigns to party k with characteristics (θk, xk) the
payoff u(θk, xk; z
i) ≡ 2αv(θk)− (xk− zi)2, with v increasing and concave. The parameter
α captures voters’ responsiveness to campaigning. Voters’ ideal points are uniformly
distributed in X.
Let θK ≡ {θk}k∈K, and xK ≡ {xk}k∈K denote the level of campaigning and policy
positions of the parties contesting the election. We assume that each party k obtains
a share of the total seats in the legislature equal to her share of votes in the election,
sk(θK, xK), and that the policy outcome is the result of a probabilistic compromise among
the parties represented in the legislature, where the likelihood of the policy represented
by a party emerging as the policy outcome is increasing in the candidate’s vote share,
4Exceptions are Herrera, Levine, and Martinelli (2008) and Degan (2008). While they both focus on
majoritarian elections with two exogenously given parties, the former consider a group turnout model
and the latter an uncertain-voter model of turnout.
5This assumption captures the fact that commitments to any other alternative policy are not credible
in the context of a static model.
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or seat share in the assembly.6 The expected share of rents appropriated by party k,
denoted mk, is proportional to his vote share in the election. For simplicity, and without
any real loss of generality, we assume that mk(θK, xK) = sk(θK, xK). Normalizing total
political rents to one, and letting C(·) ≡ Cv(·) + F , we can write the expected payoff of
a party k contesting the election as
Πk(K, xK, θK) = mk(θK, xK)− C(θk). (1)
A strategy for party k is a decision of whether or not to participate in the election, and
campaign spending θk(K, xK) ≥ 0. A strategy for voter i is a function σi(K, xK, θK) ∈ K,
where σi(K, xK, θK) = k indicates the choice of voting for party k, and σ = {σ1(·), . . . , σN(·)}
denotes a voting strategy profile. An electoral equilibrium is a pure strategy Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game of electoral competition, i.e., a strategy profile such
that (i) voters cannot obtain a better policy outcome by voting for a different party in
any voting game (on and off the equilibrium path), (ii) given the location and campaign
decisions of other parties, and given voters’ voting strategy, parties cannot increase their
expected rents by modifying their campaign levels, (iii) parties contesting the election
earn non-negative rents, and (iv) parties not contesting the election prefer not to enter:
would earn negative rents in an equilibrium of the continuation game.
Foundations of Campaign Spending. In the model, we directly assume that
campaign spending increases a party’s vote share without specifying the underlying mech-
anism. One possible justification for this effect is that campaign spending can reduce
voters’ uncertainty about candidates’ ideological positions. If voters dislike uncertainty
over the policies to be implemented by each party, then parties’ efforts aimed at informing
voters about their policy goals - by publishing and disseminating informative material
through TV, newspapers and other media - will be valued by all voters. This idea was
first formalized by Austen-Smith (1987), and finds support in the empirical literature.
Bartels (1986) shows that voters dislike uncertainty, and that the magnitude of this ef-
fect is important. Focusing on data for US legislative elections, Coleman and Manna
(2000) show that “Campaign spending increases knowledge of and affect toward the can-
didates, improves the public’s ability to place candidates on ideology and issue scales,
and encourages certainty about those placements.” Our model is fully consistent with
this mechanism, interpreting the common value dimension as reflecting the electorate’s
uncertainty about the true positions that parties will champion after elections. In partic-
ular, this happens generically when voters are policy-risk-averse as in our model given the
assumption of a quadratic policy payoff function. In this latter case, we can recover the
benchmark model starting from primitives. Suppose then that U(xk, z
i) = −β(xk − zi)2,
and that the policy yk of candidate k is perceived by voters to be distributed uniformly
on [xk − (θ), xk + (θ)], where (θ) is a decreasing and convex function of campaign
spending θ. Then the expected utility of a voter with ideal point zi can be written as
E[U(xk, z
i); θ] = −β(xk − zi)2 + v(θ), where v(θ) is an increasing and concave function
of θ.
6For a similar approach see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Persico and Sahuguet (2006).
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Policy Motivation. In the model we assume that parties are entirely office-
motivated; i.e., they do not care about policy outcomes per se, but only as a tool to get
votes.7 This is a natural assumption in the context of our static model.8 However, it is
possible to argue that politicians are also policy-motivated. This issue is not a source of
concern for any of our results. In fact we can show that if office motivation dominates
policy motivation, then all our results are qualitatively unchanged.
Here we provide the main intuition. Policy motivation introduces two effects. The
first is on the incentives of parties to participate in the election. When parties have
policy preferences, their payoff of participating in the election diminishes the closer the
other parties are in the policy space. This is the same effect identified in majoritarian
elections by Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996). But note that
in non-majoritarian elections, this “free riding” effect only reinforces a similar mech-
anism already present even in the absence of policy motivation. In fact in this case,
parties’ payoffs vary continuously with their vote shares and, as a result, diminish when
a party is championing a “crowded” ideological position. (In majoritarian elections, on
the other hand, this direct effect cannot occur due to the discontinuity in rents induced
by the winner-takes-all nature of the plurality system.) In a nutshell, in non-majoriarian
elections, the externality is internalized via vote shares.
Policy motivation also carries a second effect, on parties’ incentives to campaign. As
we show below, in our model parties compete more intensely in campaigning the closer
they are to one another in the ideological space. With policy motivation, this effect is
now ameliorated, since as parties get closer to one another, the free-riding effect also
reduces the marginal benefit of stealing votes from each other. We can show instead
that if office motivation is sufficiently important, the office-induced incentives dominate
the policy-induced incentives, and campaign is increasing the closer parties are to one
another. As a result, all our analysis is qualitatively unchanged.
3 The Institutional Determinants of Competition in
Short-Run and Long-Run Electoral Equilibria
We begin our analysis focusing on a short-run horizon in which the number of parties
competing in the election is fixed. To differentiate this from our full equilibrium analysis
with entry, we call equilibria in this restricted setting short-run electoral equilibria. In a
short-run electoral equilibrium, parties competing in the election choose campaign levels
that are best responses to one another given their location in the policy space, and
7As Strom (1990) puts it: “With a slight twist on Downs, we can define a political party as an
organization that seeks benefits derived from public office by gaining representation in duly constituted
elections.” (pg. 574)
8See Alesina (1988): “[. . . ] in general in a one-shot electoral game the only time-consistent equilibrium
is one in which no convergence is possible [. . . ] and the voters rationally expect this outcome.” (pg.
796)
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must be willing to participate (must earn non-negative rents in equilibrium), but are not
concerned about the possible entry of an out-of-equilibrium party. We begin in section
3.1 with the simplest case in which two parties compete in the election. We then move
on to the multiple party case in section 3.2. The main result of the section (Theorem 1)
is presented in Section 3.3, which deals with long-run electoral equilibria.
3.1 Short-Run Electoral Equilibrium with Two Parties
In this section, we establish two classes of results. We start by characterizing equilibria
in which parties are unconstrained in campaigning. We then analyze the effect of raising
the spending cap, taking voters’ characteristics as given.
Consider two candidates 1 and 2 representing policy positions x1 and x2 with ideologi-
cal differentiation ∆ = x2−x1, and campaign spending θ1 and θ2. Let x˜12 ∈ R denote the
(unique) value of x such that u(θ1, x1;x) = u(θ2, x2;x), so that u(θ1, x1; z
i) > u(θ2, x2; z
i)
if and only if zi > x˜12
x˜12 =
x1 + x2
2
+ α
[v(θ1)− v(θ2)]
∆
. (2)
Note that with two parties competing in the election there is no room for strategic voting,
and thus all voters vote for their preferred alternative in equilibrium. Hence, as long as
x˜12 ∈ (0, 1), candidates vote share mappings are given by m1(θ, x) = x˜12(θ, x), and
m2(θ, x) = 1 − x˜12(θ, x). We first show that when voters are sufficiently ideological –
and thus relatively unresponsive to campaign spending – it is always possible to support
a short-run electoral equilibrium in which parties are not constrained in campaigning.
What “sufficiently ideological” means here precisely depends on the cost of campaigning
evaluated at the spending cap, C(L). By letting Ψ(·) ≡ v′(·)/C ′v(·), and defining the
bound b ≡ 1/Ψ(L) if C(L) ≤ 1/2 and b ≡ 1/Ψ(C−1(1/2)) otherwise, we have the
following result.
Proposition 1 For any α ≤ b, there exists a short run electoral equilibrium with two
parties unconstrained in campaigning. In any such equilibrium, (i) there is a lower bound
on ideological differentiation ∆(α), which is increasing in α, and (ii) campaign competi-
tion is neutral for electoral outcomes. In fact
θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 = θ
∗ = Ψ−1 (∆/α) . (3)
The fact that there cannot be a campaign differential between parties is a feature
of all equilibria with two parties: while parties’ total rents depend on their ideological
positions, campaign incentives – i.e., marginal rents – depend only on their ideological
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differentiation. It follows that in a two-party equilibrium both parties must have the
same incentives in campaigning.
Note also that even for relatively low responsiveness to campaigning (i.e., α < b),
Proposition 1 identifies a lower bound on ideological differentiation as a necessary con-
dition for parties to be unconstrained in campaigning. This suggests that when instead
voters are sufficiently responsive (α is big enough), no feasible ideological differentiation
would induce a soft enough competition. As we show in the next proposition, in such
an environment parties always campaign aggressively. However, this does not mean that
such intense competition can always be carried out: depending on the total campaign
cost at the spending cap, either parties are able to sustain a high level of competition
(in which case parties are necessarily constrained by the cap) or, when they are not, the
system must lose competition altogether. In other words, when voters are easily swayed
by campaign spending, relaxing the spending cap can end up eliminating competition in
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Suppose α > b. Then if C(L) ≤ 1/2, there exists a short-run electoral
equilibrium with two parties, constrained in campaigning. If instead C(L) > 1/2, then in
all pure strategy electoral equilibria a single party runs unopposed, without campaigning.
Two remarks follow. First, note that together with Proposition 1 this result implies
that when the spending cap is relatively low, a two-party short-run electoral equilibrium
in pure strategies can be sustained independently of the value of α. In other words, the
conditions constraining the number of parties in equilibrium are entirely determined by
“supply side” factors; i.e., the cost of campaigning at the spending cap, C(L). Voters’
responsiveness to campaign advertising only affect parties’ equilibrium rents.
Second, note that in keeping with the equilibrium notion employed in the paper, the
second part of Proposition 2 states that if C(L) > 1/2, then in all electoral equilibria in
pure strategies a single party runs unopposed. The result, however, extends to equilibria
in mixed strategies as well. Since this is an interesting result in itself, we discuss this
briefly below.
Rent Dissipation in Mixed Strategy Equilibria. When C(L) > 1/2 and α > b
there cannot be a short-run electoral equilibrium in pure strategies with more than one
party. While two-party mixed-strategy equilibria certainly exist in the campaign stage,
the more relevant question for our purpose is whether in these equilibria parties will
completely dissipate their variable rents (excluding the fixed cost F ). If this were true
parties would earn negative total rents. Therefore a short-run electoral equilibrium with
two parties does not exist. It turns out that this is exactly what happens when voters’
responsiveness to campaign is high enough. To see why this is the case, notice that for
sufficiently high α, the game of campaign competition can be approximated by an all-pay
auction between parties. More precisely, for every  > 0 consider the discrete version
of the campaigning game where θ = {0, , 2, . . . , L} and, for simplicity, let Cv(L) > 1
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and (x1 + x2)/2 = 1/2, i.e., the case in which parties ideological position are symmetric
and the spending cap is never binding. Simple algebraic manipulation of equation (2)
shows that there exists a threshold α¯() ≡ ∆/2 such that if α > α¯() we can write the
expected variable rents of party k = 1, 2 as
Πvk =

1− Cv(θk) if θk > θ−k
1
2
− Cv(θk) if θk = θ−k
−Cv(θk) if θk < θ−k.
Since the campaigning stage is a discrete symmetric all-pay auction, we can use the
results of Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1994) to conclude that there exists a symmet-
ric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each party puts positive probability on all pure
strategies θk such that θk ≤ C−1v (1). As  approaches zero the equilibrium distributions
converge uniformly to the continuous uniform distribution, which is the unique equilib-
rium of a two-player all-pay auction with a continuous strategy space (Baye, Kovenock,
and de Vries (1996)). Further, as  approaches zero, expected variable rents converge to
zero; there is full rent dissipation. As a consequence, for any  we can find a sufficiently
large α such that the variable rents of this mixed-strategy equilibrium of the campaign
stage are arbitrarily small and, in particular, smaller than the fixed cost F . Hence,
restricting attention to the only class of equilibria in the campaign stage that survives
when  approaches zero, a two-party short-run electoral equilibrium does not exist and
all equilibria have a single party not investing in campaigning (this equilibrium exists
trivially for all values of (α,L)).
To sum up, in this section we established two classes of results. First, we characterized
equilibria in which parties are unconstrained in campaigning. We showed that for any
given spending cap, if voters are sufficiently unresponsive to parties’ campaign efforts
(i.e., sufficiently ideological), then there exists a short-run equilibrium with two parties
unconstrained in campaigning. In any such equilibrium both parties must spend an equal
amount on campaigning, and as a result campaign competition is neutral for electoral
outcomes. Campaign competition does however affect political rents. In fact we showed
that political rents increase – as equilibrium campaign spending decreases – the larger
is the ideological differentiation among parties in the election. Second, we considered
the effect of raising the spending cap, taking voters’ characteristics as given. We showed
that when voters are highly responsive to campaigning, raising spending caps can have
an anti-competitive effect in equilibrium. This remarkable result is due to the fact that
in this situation raising the spending cap increases the cost of campaign competition,
and eventually leads to the impossibility of sustaining competition in equilibrium: for
high enough L, all equilibria (in pure and mixed strategies) have a single party running
in the election.
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3.2 Short-Run Electoral Equilibrium with Multiple Parties
In this section we extend the previous analysis of short-run electoral equilibria to the
case of K ≥ 3 parties. Considering a multiparty environment introduces some non-
trivial theoretical considerations, which we discuss and address immediately below. We
then present the main results of this section in Proposition 3 and its corollaries.
The first potential complication in dealing with multiparty equilibria concerns the
characterization of the vote share functions. With only two alternatives, there is no
room for strategic voting, and thus in equilibrium all voters vote for their preferred
party in every subgame. With more than two parties, instead, a voter might conceivably
benefit from voting for a party other than her most preferred, if by doing so she reduces
the likelihood of ending up with her least preferred policy outcome. Lemma 3 in the
Appendix rules out this possibility, and shows that in any voting subgame of any electoral
equilibrium, voters vote for their preferred alternative. This result simplifies considerably
the characterization of electoral equilibria, assuring uniquely determined, smooth and well
behaved vote share functions for all parties on and off the equilibrium path.
The second consideration brought by multiparty competition in non-majoritarian
elections concerns the incentives to spend in campaigning, and is substantially more
involved. The first point to note is that for any number K of parties competing in
the election, small changes in party k’s campaign spending only lead to changes in the
distribution of votes between k and its two “effective” competitors, one to each side
of the policy spectrum. Given the identity of k’s relevant competitors at a particular
campaign spending profile, the marginal impact of k’s campaign spending on vote shares
is always local in nature, and therefore well defined. In particular, the marginal benefit of
campaign spending increases the larger is voters’ responsiveness to campaign spending,
the less differentiated k is on average with regards to his effective competitors, and given
this, the less symmetric is k’s differentiation with regards to his relevant competitors.
The complication arises because the identity of k’s effective competitors will not
necessarily remain fixed at different campaign spending profiles, and in particular it will
not always coincide with that of k’s closest neighbors. But since closer parties in the policy
space are better substitutes for each other, changes in party k’s campaign spending will
have a stronger impact on how voters rank k relative to its closest competitors than to
more distant parties in the policy space. As a result, changes in the identity of a party’s
relevant competitors will lead to non-differentiabilities in the mapping from campaign
spending to vote shares and discontinuities in the marginal vote share mapping.
In Proposition 3, however, we show that under some conditions the action identified
as optimal by the first order condition will indeed be a best response. In particular, we
prove that this is true for all strategy profiles with K ≥ 3, where all parties representing
interior positions k = 2, . . . , K − 1 choose equal campaign spending; i.e., θ∗k = θ∗ for all
k = 2, . . . , K − 1. The intuition for this result is that with symmetry, the discontinu-
ities described above occur at levels of campaigning that are all larger than the optimal
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solution and thus never reached in a best response (the interested reader is referred to
Appendix B for a more detailed discussion).
To state this formally, we define a class of electoral equilibria in which all parties
contesting the election are located at the same distance to their closest neighbors. We
call equilibria of this class location-symmetric (LS) electoral equilibria.
Definition 1 An electoral equilibrium is a location-symmetric (LS) electoral equilibrium
if xk+1 − xk = ∆ for any k < K, and x1 = 1− xK.
The next lemma shows that the non-differentiabilities in the mapping of campaign in-
vestment to vote shares discussed above are not relevant in a LS equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Consider a LS equilibrium with K ≥ 3 parties contesting the election such
that θ∗k < L for all k. Then parties’ equilibrium campaign spending is given by
θ∗k = Ψ
−1 (∆/2α) for all k = 2, . . . , K − 1 and θ∗1 = θ∗K = Ψ−1 (∆/α) . (4)
Notice that in any LS equilibrium it will always be the case that θ∗1 = θ
∗
K and that θ
∗
k = θ
∗
for all k = 2, . . . , K − 1.
Building on Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 – and letting a ≡ C(L)/2Ψ(L) and a ≡
C(L)/Ψ(L) – the next result extends Propositions 1 and 2 to the case of multiple parties.
Proposition 3 Take an integer K ≥ 3 as given. If K×C(L) ≤ 1 there exists a short-run
LS equilibrium with K parties. Moreover, for any α there is a short-run LS equilibrium
(x∗1(α), θ
∗
1(α),∆
∗(α), θ∗(α)) such that
1. If α ≤ a, then all parties are campaign unconstrained, i.e., θ∗1 = Ψ−1(∆∗(α)/α) <
θ∗(α) = Ψ−1(∆∗(α)/2α) < L. Further, for every party k campaign spending is
decreasing with ideological differentiation and voters’ ideological focus.
2. If a ≤ α ≤ a, then only parties representing interior ideological positions are con-
strained by campaign spending caps, i.e., θ∗1(α) = Ψ
−1(∆∗(α)/α) < θ∗(α) = L.
3. If α ≥ a, then all parties are campaign constrained, i.e., θ∗1(α) = θ∗(α) = L.
Together with the results of Section 3.1, Proposition 3 implies that for any integer K ≥ 2
such that K × C(L) ≤ 1, there exists a short-run electoral equilibrium with K parties.
This result generalizes our previous conclusions, and yields two key implications.
First, note that – differently to a model in which the number of parties is given, in
which limiting campaign spending can possibly increase but never reduce parties’ rents
– here tightening the campaign spending cap can lead to a larger number of parties in
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equilibrium, increasing competitive pressures as a result. By the same logic, relaxing the
campaign spending cap leads (eventually) to less parties, reducing the set of alternatives
available to voters, and the competitiveness of the election. In fact, as we showed in
the previous section for the specific case of two parties, increasing the spending cap can
possibly eliminate competition altogether. This is indeed true for any K: we can find
an α large enough such that if the spending cap L grows large, the unique short-run
equilibrium has a single party not investing in campaigning.9 Second, note that the
conditions constraining the number of parties in equilibrium are entirely determined by
supply side factors: the cost of campaigning at the spending cap, C(L). Instead the
responsiveness of voters to campaigning plays no role in defining the number of parties
that can be competing for votes in a short-run equilibrium.
The uncoupling of supply and demand factors in the determination of the number
of parties does not mean, of course, that “demand-side” factors are irrelevant for equi-
librium. Instead, the level of voters’ ideological focus impacts the intensity of campaign
competition between the given number of parties competing for votes in the election. In
particular, for any given spending cap L, if voters are sufficiently ideological (α is low),
parties will be unconstrained by spending caps in equilibrium. As voters’ ideological
focus diminishes, first centrist candidates and eventually all candidates will hit campaign
constraints. What makes this possible is that in these equilibria parties earn strictly
positive rents from participating in the electoral competition. This allows the system
enough flexibility so that the number of parties in the election can be independent of
demand-side factors: as voters become more responsive to campaign spending, campaign
competition becomes tighter and candidates “compete away” their rents. The campaign
finance limits prevent complete rent dissipation. We establish this formally in the next
corollary.
Corollary 1 Take K ≥ 3 as given, and assume K×C(L) ≤ 1. Then for any α there is a
short-run LS equilibrium (x∗1(α), θ
∗
1(α),∆
∗(α), θ∗(α)) with associated rents (Π∗1(α),Π
∗(α))
for parties representing extreme and interior ideological positions respectively, such that
1. Π∗1(α) is strictly decreasing for all α < a, and positive and constant for all α > a.
2. Π∗(α) is strictly decreasing for all α < a, and positive and constant for all α > a.
It is worth noticing that the mere presence of campaign limits does not prevent
complete rent dissipation in equilibrium. Indeed, we can show that there exists an a′
such that for all α < a′ there exists a short-run LS equilibrium with at least three parties
in which θ∗k(α) < L for all k, and all interior parties earn zero rents. This result follows
from the second part of Lemma 6 in the appendix.
9The logic behind this result is very similar to the case of two parties and exploits the property that
in any equilibrium of an all-pay auction with any number of players and identical valuations, there is
complete rent dissipation (see Theorem 1 of Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996)).
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3.3 Electoral Competition in Long-Run Equilibria
So far we focused on short-run electoral equilibria, in which incumbent parties cannot
be challenged by new parties, even if they represent poor alternatives for a large fraction
of voters. In a longer time horizon, however, we expect entry to be a relevant factor in
shaping electoral outcomes. In this section, we extend the analysis to long-run electoral
equilibria. A strategy profile is a long run electoral equilibrium (or simply an electoral
equilibrium) if it is a short-run electoral equilibrium, and in addition parties not partic-
ipating would obtain negative rents if they chose to enter the electoral competition.
Do our previous short-run results stand in this long-run setting? Remarkably, the
answer is an unqualified yes. As in a short-run equilibrium, it is still the case that in-
creasing the spending cap reduces the maximum number of parties that can be contesting
the election. In the long-run analysis, in addition, the fixed cost of entry provides a lower
bound on the equilibrium number of parties.10 Still, as before, there are always con-
ditions for which the responsiveness of voters to campaigning plays no role in defining
the number of parties that can be competing for votes in equilibrium. In particular,
the uncoupling of supply and demand for the determination of the equilibrium number
of parties is still valid in the long-run equilibrium analysis: the equilibrium number of
parties is determined entirely by the variable cost of campaigning at the spending cap,
Cv(L), and the fixed cost of entry F . Finally, reducing voters’ ideological focus has the
effect of increasing the intensity of campaign competition and reducing parties’ rents. As
in Corollary 1, it is the excess rents in equilibrium which allows the uncoupling of demand
and supply side in the determination of the equilibrium number of parties. These results
follow from Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1 Take K ≥ 2 as given. If K × C(L) ≤ 1 and K × F ≥ 1/2, there exists a
long-run electoral equilibrium with K parties. Moreover, there exist thresholds (α, α) and,
for any α, either a long-run LS equilibrium (x∗1(α), θ
∗
1(α),∆
∗(α), θ∗(α)) or a two-party
electoral equilibrium (x∗1(α),∆
∗(α), θ∗(α)) such that
1. If α ≤ α, then all parties campaign unconstrained, and for every party k, campaign
spending is decreasing in parties’ ideological differentiation. In particular, θ∗1 =
Ψ−1(∆∗(α)/α) < θ∗(α) = Ψ−1(∆∗(α)/2α) < L for K > 2, and θ∗ = Ψ−1(∆∗(α)/α)
for K = 2.
2. If α ≥ α all parties are campaign constrained.
The main logic driving the results of Theorem 1 is best grasped by considering the
special case of two parties unconstrained in campaigning. This is covered in Lemma 2
below.
10Furthermore, the long-run analysis introduces new bounds on ideological differentiation between
parties in equilibrium. We elaborate on this at the end of this section.
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Lemma 2 Suppose that 2 × C(L) ≤ 1 and 2 × F ≥ 1/2. Then for any α ≤ α2P there
exists a long-run two-party electoral equilibrium (x∗1(α),∆
∗(α), θ∗(α)) such that both par-
ties campaign unconstrained, and campaign spending is decreasing in parties’ ideological
differentiation. In particular, θ∗ = Ψ−1(∆∗(α)/α) < L.
Proof of Lemma 2. We showed in Proposition 1 that if two parties compete for
votes in the election, and (i) voters vote for their preferred party, (ii) both parties are
unconstrained in campaign spending and choose
θ∗k = θ
∗ = Ψ−1
(
∆
α
)
,
and (iii) parties’ ideological differentiation ∆ ≥ αΨ(L) (with C(L) ≤ 1/2), then there is
a location of the left party x1 such that a short-run electoral equilibrium exists. We next
show that if conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied, and parties’ ideological differentiation
∆ ∈ D∗, where
D∗ ≡ {∆ : max{2Cv(L), 1− 2F, αΨ(L)} ≤ ∆ ≤ min{1− 2Cv(L), 2C(L)}} ,
then there is a location of the left party x1 such that a long-run electoral equilibrium
exists. First notice that for D∗ to be nonempty it is sufficient that
α ≤ min
{
2
C(L)
Ψ(L)
,
1− 2Cv(L)
Ψ(L)
}
≡ α2P ,
and C(L) = Cv(L) + F ≤ 1/2 and F ≥ 1/4 (which in turn implies Cv(L) ≤ F ). Hence,
if 2 × C(L) ≤ 1, 2 × F ≥ 1/2, and α ≤ α2P a long-run two-party electoral equilibrium
exists. We now show why these conditions are sufficient.
Let ∆ = αΨ(L)(1 + ε) for ε > 0. First we show that entry in (x1, x2) is not profitable.
Suppose that j enters at xj ∈ (x1, x2), and consider the following continuation: θˆ1 =
θˆ2 = θˆj = 1. Letting δ
r
j ≡ (x2 − xj)/∆, we have that the necessary first order conditions
(FOC) for a maximum for k = 1 and k = 2 are
α
(1− δrj )∆
v′(L) ≥ C ′v(L) and
α
δrj∆
v′(L) ≥ C ′v(L),
while the FOC for j is αv′(L) ≥ δrj (1 − δrj )∆C ′v(L) which is implied by the previous
inequalities. These conditions are satisfied if and only if
max{δrj∆, (1− δrj )∆} ≤ αΨ(L). (5)
Suppose first that δrj ≤ 1/2. Then (5) is (1 − δrj )∆ ≤ αΨ(L), or substituting ∆ =
αΨ(L)(1 + ε), δrj ≥ ε/(1 + ε). When instead δrj ≥ 1/2, then (5) is δrj∆ ≤ αΨ(L), or
substituting ∆ = αΨ(L)(1 + ε), δrj ≤ 1/(1 + ε). Thus
ε
1 + ε
≤ δrj ≤
1
1 + ε
. (6)
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Note that since ε > 0, the interval defined in (6) is strictly included in (0, 1). Thus for
relatively centrist entrants, θˆ1 = θˆ2 = θˆj = L is a joint best response provided that the
incumbent parties choose not to quit campaigning. To insure that this is the case, it is
enough to consider the case of δrj approaching either 0 or 1.
11 Hence, a necessary and
sufficient condition for party 1 not to quit campaigning upon entry is x1 ≥ Cv(L). The
case of δrj reaching its upper bound is similar and yields 1−x2 ≥ Cv(L) as a necessary and
sufficient condition for party 2 to prefer not to quit campaigning. Since x1+∆+1−x2 = 1,
these conditions can be satisfied if and only if ∆ ≤ 1− 2Cv(L).
Now, given that θˆ1 = θˆ2 = θˆj = L we have that Πj(θˆj) = ∆/2−C(L) < 0 if and only
if ∆ < 2C(L). Next, consider entry such that δrj > 1/(1 + ε). Here j enters relatively
close to k = 1, and the strategy profile in the continuation game in which all three parties
choose L cannot be an equilibrium. Consider instead θˆ2 ∈ (0, 1), and θˆ1 = θˆj = L. The
necessary first order condition for k = 2 is
θˆ2 = Ψ
−1
(
δrj∆
α
)
= Ψ−1
(
δrjΨ(L)(1 + ε)
)
< L,
where the second equality follows from ∆ = αΨ(L)(1 + ε), and the inequality follows
from the fact that δrj > 1/(1 + ε), and that Ψ(·) is decreasing. The FOC for j is not
relevant. The FOC for k = 1 is (1− δrj )∆ ≤ αΨ(L), which is implied by δrj > 1/(1 + ε).
We now need to show that
Πj(θˆj) = x˜j2(L, θˆ2)− x1 + xj
2
− Cv(L)− F < 0.
Now if x˜1j were fixed, j would be better off choosing θ˜j = θˆ2 (as in the case of a two-
parties equilibrium). But then Πˆj < ∆/2− Cv(L)− F < 0 from ∆ < 2(Cv(L) + F ). As
before, we need to make sure that the incumbent parties choose not to quit campaigning
in the continuation game. However, from the previous discussion we know that there
exist parameters values for which incumbent parties will not quit campaigning as long
as ∆ ≤ 1− 2Cv(L).
To deter entry in [0, x1) and (x2, 1] it is sufficient that (1) ∆ ≥ 2Cv(L), and (2)
∆ ≥ 1−2F . Condition (1) guarantees that the incumbents are not quitting campaigning
upon entry. Condition (2) is a sufficient condition for the existence of x1, and x2 such
that max{x1, 1− x2} ≤ F . The latter inequality is clearly enough to guarantee no entry
of an extreme party, and since x1 + ∆ + 1 − x2 = 1, it can be satisfied if and only if
∆ ≥ 1− 2F .
We conclude this section with two observations. First, while Theorem 1 refers to
the case of K ≥ 2, extending the result to a single party is straightforward. First, it is
11The reason for this is that when δrj reaches say its lower bound (i.e., when entry occurs in a right
neighborhood of x1), than necessarily θˆ1 = θˆj = L is optimal. Hence, the incumbent rents approaches
x1, which must be larger than Cv(L) in order for party 1 to prefer not to quit campaigning. When
instead δrj is strictly bigger than zero, either θˆ1 = L is still optimal and necessarily Π1(θˆ1)|θˆ1=L ≥ x1, or
if θˆ1 < L is optimal then it must be that Π1(θˆ1)|θˆ1<L > Π1(θˆ1)|θˆ1=L ≥ x1.
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immediate to verify that there always exists a short-run electoral equilibrium with one
party running uncontested. Furthermore, in the case of a single party, the condition
K × F ≥ 1/2 becomes F ≥ 1/2. Hence, if the incumbent is located at the preferred
position of the median voter, x = 1/2, the potential entry of a challenger is always
deterred. To see why this must be the case, note that the continuation game after entry
of a challenger must be a two-party equilibrium, and therefore campaign competition
will be neutral for electoral outcomes in that continuation game. Since the incumbent is
located at the median, it follows that the challenger’s vote share will always be smaller
than 1/2. But then F ≥ 1/2 implies that the entrant would earn negative total rents.12
Second, when voters are sufficiently responsive to campaign spending, some of the
sufficient conditions we used in the proof of Theorem 1 become necessary. We can then
show that as L increases the set of long-run two-party electoral equilibria converges to
the equilibrium that maximizes ideological representation, i.e., the location of parties that
minimizes the total distance between voters’ ideological preferences and parties’ positions.
This finding echoes a well-know result in industrial organization since x1 = 1− x2 = 1/4
is the socially optimal location of two competing shops in the unit interval; i.e., the one
that minimizes buyers’ transportation costs (see Hotelling (1929)).
Proposition 4 Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied for K = 2. Then
there exists an α∗∗ such that for all α > α∗∗, as L increases the set of long-run two-
party electoral equilibria converges to a single equilibrium (x∗∗1 (α),∆
∗∗(α), θ∗∗(α)). In this
equilibrium, parties are positioned in the unique symmetric configuration that maximizes
voters’ ideological representation.
To sum up, in this section we uncovered an important interaction between campaign
spending and the competitiveness of the political arena. In particular, we argued that the
overall competitiveness of the political sector depends both on the endogenous number of
parties contesting the election and the endogenous level of campaign competition. Our
model shows that these two dimensions are linked together through their combined effect
on the total equilibrium level of rents. Campaign finance regulation crucially affects this
mechanism. We have shown that regulating campaign spending may avoid a perverse
anti-competitive effect, that is due to the fact that increasing spending caps heightens
campaign competition, reduces political rents, and as a result reduces the number of
parties contesting the election.
In the next section, we study the effects of a rather different policy – compulsory
voting – on the competitiveness of the political sector. It turns out that under some
conditions, compulsory voting and campaign spending limits have a similar effect, and
can both lead to an increased competition in the policy dimension.
12Note that since the incumbent obtains more than half of all votes, and Cv(θ) ≤ 1/2 for all θ ≤ L by
hypothesis, the incumbent has an incentive to campaign in any continuation game following entry.
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4 Turnout and Compulsory Voting
When voting is costless abstention is dominated, and a voter’s strategy is restricted
to choosing which of the parties participating in the election they will vote for. In
this section, we consider the case in which voting is costly. In this case, a fraction of
the voters might choose to abstain in equilibrium if they are free to do so, and full
participation will generally require a policy of compulsory voting. Our goal is to compare
equilibrium outcomes under compulsory and voluntary voting. We consider two related
issues. First, we focus on how the number of parties competing in the election, the policy
positions they represent, and their level of campaign spending affect which and how many
voters abstain. Second, we study how the possibility of abstention affects the intensity
of campaign competition in equilibrium.
For our present purposes, it is enough to focus on short-run electoral equilibria in
which parties are unconstrained in campaign spending. We begin with the two-party
case. We show that in this context only centrist voters abstain. Furthermore, an increase
in polarization increases turnout and decreases campaign spending. The possibility of
abstention, however, has no direct effect on campaign spending. We then show that these
conclusions do not generally extend to multiparty equilibria. In particular, we show that
with more than two parties, abstention does have a direct effect on campaign spending.
Consider a modified version of the model of Section 2 in which N voters choose not
only which party to vote for if they vote, but also if they want to vote at all (at cost
τ > 0) or abstain. We begin by analyzing symmetric electoral equilibria in which two
parties k = 1, 2 compete for votes in the election. We can thus write x1 = 1/2 − ∆/2
and x2 = 1/2 + ∆/2 for ∆ ∈ (0, 1). We look for an equilibrium in which abstainers
have ideological positions in an interval (x˜`12, x˜
r
12) around that of the critical individual
x˜12 who is indifferent between the two parties (as defined in (2)). We then show in the
proof of Proposition 5 that all electoral equilibria with two parties in which some voters
abstain must have this property.
Note that x˜`12 (similarly, x˜
r
12) is given by the position of the voter who is indifferent
between voting for party 1 (party 2) and abstaining. Thus (x˜`12, x˜
r
12) solves the system of
equations 
(1−x˜r12)(u(θ1,x1;x˜`12)−u(θ2,x2;x˜`12))
N(1−x˜r12+x˜`12)(1−x˜r12+x˜`12− 1N )
= τ
x˜`12(u(θ2,x2;x˜r12)−u(θ1,x1;x˜r12))
N(1−x˜r12+x˜`12)(1−x˜r12+x˜`12− 1N )
= τ,
which in turn can be written as{
x˜`12 = x˜12t
x˜r12 = 1− (1− x˜12)t, (7)
where t is the total voter turnout
t =
2∆(1− x˜12)x˜12 + τ
2∆(1− x˜12)x˜12 +Nτ .
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These results have important implications for the characterization of two-party equilibria
with costly voluntary voting. Consider a sequence of games with increasing population
sizes. For there to be an equilibrium with abstention even in the limit as N → ∞, it
must be that limN→∞ limτ→0Nτ = A > 0. Then
t˜ ≡ lim
N→∞
lim
τ→0
t =
1
1 + A
2∆(1−x˜12)x˜12
=
1
1 + A1
2
∆−2[α(v(θ1)−v(θ2))]2
Note that voter turnout is an increasing function of polarization ∆, and that turnout
vanishes as ∆ approaches 0. This implies that the possibility of abstention imposes a
lower bound on ideological differentiation between parties even in the absence of the
threat of entry. Second, note that voter turnout is a decreasing function of (voters’
valuation of) the campaign differential between parties, α|v(θ1)− v(θ2)|. It follows from
this that whenever parties are matching each other campaign spending levels, an increase
in campaign spending by party j will reduce total voter turnout.
The previous analysis might suggest that the possibility of abstention alters parties’
incentives to engage in campaign competition. This, however, is not the case. Note that
from (7), given candidates positions ∆ and campaign spending levels (θ1, θ2), the vote
share of party 1 is m1(∆, θ1, θ2) = x˜
`
12/t = x˜12, as in the compulsory voting model.
To see why voluntary voting does not affect campaign competition with two par-
ties, it is useful to compare the role of campaigning in the benchmark model with cost-
less/compulsory voting, with its role in the extended model with costly voluntary voting.
In the benchmark model, campaign spending by one party has the effect of directly “steal-
ing” votes from the opposition. With abstention, however, campaign spending by party
1 encourages more of its own supporters to vote and – by also making it more attractive
to party 2 supporters – reduces the turnout of the competitor’s supporters (i.e., increases
x˜`12 and x˜
r
12). Simple inspection of (7) shows that in any two-party equilibrium the mass
of individuals supporting one party and showing up to the poll is linear in total turnout.
Therefore the two effects exactly offset each other: campaign spending attracts less party
1 supporters than in the compulsory voting model, but it reduces total turnout propor-
tionally at party 2’s expense. Overall, the change in vote share exactly adds up to the
vote stealing effect of the compulsory voting model. We conclude that in an equilibrium
with two parties, abstention is incentive-neutral.
Putting everything together, it follows that while in equilibrium turnout t∗ = (∆ +
2τ)/(∆+2Nτ) is increasing in polarization ∆ – so that when polarization increases, cam-
paign spending decreases and turnout increases – the intensity of campaign competition
has no direct effect on voter turnout. Without any other alternatives entering into voters’
calculations, individuals who choose to abstain must be locally centrist : must have ideal
policies around that of the individual who is indifferent between the two parties.
Note that the the fact that parties are located symmetrically around the median does
not play any role in the argument. These conclusions hold in all electoral equilibria with
two parties. Proposition 5 state these results formally.
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Proposition 5 In any electoral equilibrium with two parties, abstainers have ideal poli-
cies contained in an interval around the position of the voter who is indifferent between
parties. Furthermore, turnout is increasing in polarization but unaffected by the intensity
of campaign competition: abstention is incentive-neutral.
With more than two parties competing for votes, the logic behind Proposition 5
breaks down. The reason is that with multiple parties, abstention has a global effect on
representation. With more parties, the decision of whether to abstain or not involves two
considerations. One is local in nature: who to vote for if one votes. This only affects the
two relevant options for any voter, say k and k+ 1. The second consideration has global
consequences. When the voter votes for k instead of not voting at all, she diminishes the
vote share of all parties competing for votes, both near or far in the ideological spectrum.
To illustrate the working of these channels in equilibria with multiple parties it is
enough to consider equilibria with three parties. Now, since abstention has global effects,
the entire profile of ideological positions represented by parties contesting the election
becomes relevant. As a result, focusing exclusively on LS equilibria entails a significant
loss of generality. We will therefore distinguish between symmetric and asymmetric
equilibria in this context. In Proposition 6 we show that when the configuration of
parties is symmetric, abstainers are globally centrists : not indifferent between parties j
and k, or k and `, but instead around the policy position represented by the centrist
party. In an equilibrium of this kind, all abstainers – and in fact all supporters of the
centrist party – are indifferent between voting for their preferred candidate and abstaining
(the equilibrium turnout rate attains this indifference). In an asymmetric equilibrium
instead, abstention is local, but can only occur on one side of the median: the ideologies
of abstainers are represented either by an interval around x˜12 or by an interval around
x˜23.
Proposition 6 Consider an electoral equilibrium with three parties. If the equilibrium
is location-symmetric, abstainers have ideal policies contained in an interval around the
position of the centrist party. If instead the equilibrium is asymmetric, abstainers’ ideal
policies are either contained in an interval around x˜12 or in an interval around x˜23.
To get some intuition for how these results come about, consider first a highly asym-
metric equilibrium, with |x3 − x2| << |x1 − x2|. Note that as |x2 − x3| → 0, voters
effectively face a choice between two alternatives, and we have established before that in
this case abstainers are in an interval around the individual who is indifferent between
the two parties, x˜12. The highly asymmetric equilibrium with three parties will still be
different than the two party equilibrium because parties 2 and 3 spend more in cam-
paigning than what a single party 2 would spend, but this higher spending is already
included in the determination of x˜12(θ), so the logic is unchanged.
When the location of parties is less asymmetric, it is still the case that individuals who
choose to abstain are those with the weakest net policy preferences. This group includes
individuals with ideal policies in an interval around x˜12, but also possibly individuals
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with ideal policies around x˜23. And while it is clear that when the asymmetry is only
slightly less severe abstainers must come only from around x˜12, this turns out to be true
even when the asymmetry is very small.13
Call B(x) the net benefit of voting for an individual with ideal policy x. In the proof
we show (still assuming without loss of generality that |x3 − x2| < |x1 − x2|) that party
2’s potential supporters’ net benefit of voting is increasing in their ideological position;
i.e., that B(x) is increasing for all x between x˜12 and x˜23. At the same time, party
1’s potential supporters’ net benefit of voting is decreasing in their ideological position:
B(x) is decreasing for all x between 0 and x˜12. By symmetry of the argument, it follows
that if instead |x3 − x2| > |x1 − x2|), then party 2’s potential supporters’ net benefit of
voting must be decreasing in their ideological position; i.e., that B(x) is decreasing for
all x between x˜12 and x˜23. It follows that if |x3− x2| = |x1− x2| (as in a LS equilibrium)
then all party 2 supporters must have the same net benefit of voting: B(x) = δ for all
x ∈ (x˜12, x˜23) and some constant δ. Thus in a LS equilibrium all individuals abstaining
must be supporters of party 2. How many of them abstain will be determined by an
equilibration condition (δ = 0), much as in an equilibrium in mixed strategies. When
we move from a LS equilibrium to a slightly asymmetric configuration, this non-generic
equilibration condition breaks down completely: B(x) is again strictly monotonic for all
supporters of party 2, and abstention must be in some interval either around x˜12 or x˜23.
Having characterized abstention patterns in this setting, we now tackle the effect of
abstention on campaign spending. We showed before that in the two party setting, ab-
stention is incentive neutral for parties; i.e., the possibility of abstention does not change
parties’ campaign spending levels in equilibrium. The abstention patterns uncovered by
Proposition 6 however, suggest that this will not be the case in asymmetric equilibria
with multiple parties. In our final results, we establish this result formally. We do this
in the three-party setting, in the case of a small cost of voting. We refer to this as
almost-costless voting.
We define almost-costless as follows. Let t∗(τ,P ,∆) denote turnout in equilibrium
given voting cost τ , parameters P and party differentiation D ≡ {x1,∆1,∆2}. For any
η > 0, we say that voting is η-costly given (τ,P ,D) if τ ∈ T (τ,P ,D) ≡ {τ ∈ [0, 1] : 0 <
1− t∗(τ,P ,D) < η}. We say that voting is almost costless if it is η-costly for arbitrarily
small η.
Proposition 7 Suppose that voting is voluntary and almost costless, and fix an asym-
metric short-run electoral equilibria with three parties. (1) In any such equilibrium, at
least one party spends more in campaigning than when voting is costless/compulsory.
13The result that all abstainers have ideal policies to the left of the median even when the location of
parties is arbitrarily close to being symmetric is due to the quadratic utility assumed for voters. In the
general case of a concave utility function, it is possible that both individuals to the left and right of the
median abstain, but most abstainers will have ideal policies to the left of the median. This asymmetry
is what is key for our results.
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Furthermore, (2) if (
x2 − 1
2
)
+
(
x3 − x1
2
)
>
1
2
,
then all parties spend more resources in campaigning when voting is voluntary and almost
costless than when it is costless or compulsory.
To grasp the main logic behind this result, assume without loss of generality that
|x3 − x2| < |x1 − x2|, so that individuals abstaining are in a neighborhood of x˜12. Focus
on the incentives of party 1. The total effect of an increase in campaign spending on
its vote share can be divided into two components. First, as we already mentioned
before, for given turnout level an increase in party 1’s campaign expenditure “persuades”
potential supporters of party 1 that were previously abstaining to turnout and vote, and
“discourages” supporters of party 2 that were previously voting to do so. This is the
local effect. Second, there is a global effect that follows from the fact that overall turnout
is changing. In the case of almost costless voting we can show that the discouragement
effect on party 2 supporters dominates the persuasion effect on party 1 supporters. As
a result, an increase in party 1’s campaign expenditures reduces turnout. Since this
reduction in turnout (at party 2’s expense) further increases party 1’s vote share, it
follows that the marginal return of campaign spending for party 1 must be higher when
voting is voluntary than when it is compulsory.
Note that
(
x3−x1
2
)
is a measure of polarization, and
(
x2 − 12
)
is a measure of asym-
metry of parties’ ideological positions. Hence, while in general the marginal return of
campaign spending for party 2 and 3 can be smaller or larger, Proposition 7 states
that if asymmetry and polarization are sufficiently large, then all parties spend more
resources in campaigning when voting is voluntary and almost costless than when it is
costless/compulsory. The results of Proposition 7 have direct consequences on the rents
obtained by parties in equilibrium. We state these in the next remark.
Remark 1 Suppose voting is almost-costless and consider a short run equilibrium with
three parties. If asymmetry and polarization are sufficiently large, a policy of compulsory
voting increases the rents of all parties.
Notice that a policy of compulsory voting confines campaign competition to have
only a local effect: by definition there is no global effect on turnout. On the other hand,
we showed that if in a short-run equilibrium asymmetry and polarization are sufficiently
large, the global effect of campaign spending on turnout has a pro-competitive nature.
As a result, the overall effect of a policy of compulsory voting is to reduce the competition
among parties. We know from our previous analysis that the higher are the rents for
parties contesting the election, the higher are the incentives for new parties to enter the
competition. Hence, Remark 1 identifies conditions under which, somewhat surprisingly,
a policy of compulsory voting leads to qualitatively similar results on equilibrium rents
(and therefore on political competition) than a campaign-finance regulation that tightens
parties’ spending caps: it reduces the competitiveness of the political arena and may
eventually lead to an increase in the number of parties.
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While a complete characterization of equilibria with multiple parties and voluntary
voting is beyond the scope of this paper, the results of this section highlight the im-
portance of looking at total political rents – and their effect on the competitiveness of
elections – when evaluating the effects of policies designed to regulate electoral competi-
tion.
5 Conclusion
After the last decades of advances in the theory of industrial organization, it is now
evident that putting together price competition with entry of new firms is key for the
analysis of regulatory and antitrust policies. Putting together campaign competition
with entry of new parties is no less important for the regulation of electoral politics.
In this paper, we studied a model of elections in non-majoritarian systems that cap-
tures the link between competition in policies and competition in campaign spending.
The main thrust of the paper is that it is crucial to consider the overall competitiveness
of elections – resulting from both ideological differentiation and campaigning – when
evaluating policies designed to regulate electoral competition.
We illustrate this point through the analysis of two major electoral institutions. First
we consider campaign spending limits. We show that increasing the spending cap can re-
duce the set of alternatives available to voters. This result relies completely on the level of
political rents up for grabs. In fact, we show that this happens even when the equilibrium
number of parties is unaffected by the responsiveness of voters to political campaigning.
Second, we introduce costly voting, and consider a policy of compulsory voting vis a vis
voluntary voting. We show that in the special case of two parties contesting the election,
abstention is incentive-neutral. With more than two parties, however, this is not generi-
cally the case. We provide conditions for which compulsory voting reduces the incentives
of all parties to spend in campaigning, increasing equilibrium political rents and making
the entry of new parties more attractive.
The paper opens several avenues for future research. While in this paper we confined
our analysis to abstract non-majoritarian electoral systems, the analysis can be extended
to other electoral institutions (see Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2009)). In addition, ex-
tending our static model to a dynamic framework would allow us to tackle how term
limits and incumbency influence electoral outcomes through their effect on total political
rents. The model also has important implications for applied research. Besides deliver-
ing a number of novel empirical implications, our analysis makes clear that generically,
campaign spending and entry should be treated as jointly determined in equilibrium.
22
6 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a candidate equilibrium strategy profile in which
campaign constraints are not binding; i.e., max{θ∗1, θ∗2} < L. Note that if x˜12 ∈ (0, 1) the
vote share mapping m1(θ1; θ2, x) is differentiable and the marginal vote share is given by
∂m1
∂θ1
=
αv′(θ1)
∆
.
The fact that campaign constraints are not binding implies that the necessary first order
condition must be satisfied with equality, i.e. αv′(θ∗k) = ∆C
′
v(θ
∗
k) for k = 1, 2 or
θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 = θ
∗ = Ψ−1 (∆/α) . (8)
This implies that in any equilibrium with two parties in which they are not campaign
constrained, there cannot be a differential in campaign investments. Moreover, it also
implies that in any two-party equilibrium in which parties are not campaign constrained,
they must be sufficiently ideologically differentiated, i.e. ∆ ≥ αΨ(L).14
Since θ∗1 = θ
∗
2, candidates’ vote shares are m1 = x1 + ∆/2, and m2 = 1 − x1 −∆/2,
and therefore Π∗1 = x1 + ∆/2−C(θ∗) and Π∗2 = 1−x1−∆/2−C(θ∗) are the equilibrium
rents. The equilibrium requirement that parties earn non-negative rents implies that
(x1,∆) ∈ A, where
A ≡ {(x1,∆) : C(Ψ−1 (∆/α))−∆/2 ≤ x1 ≤ 1−∆/2− C(Ψ−1 (∆/α))}.
Note that if there exists some pair of candidates locations (x1,∆) ∈ A , then the sym-
metric configuration x′1 = 1 − x1 belongs to A as well. It then follows from the above
inequalities that the set A is nonempty (i.e., there exists a pair of candidate locations
(x1,∆) such that both parties earn non-negative rents in equilibrium) if and only if
C(θ∗) ≤ 1/2. Now, suppose first that C(L) ≤ 1/2. Then C(θ) ≤ 1/2 for all θ, and thus
the fact that A is nonempty follows immediately. Thus the necessary condition for interior
campaigning αΨ(L) ≤ ∆ is the binding constraint. As a result, when C(L) ≤ 1/2 there
is an equilibrium with two parties unconstrained in campaigning as long as αΨ(L) ≤ 1.
So suppose instead that C(L) > 1/2. Substituting θ∗, we can write C(θ∗) ≤ 1/2 as
∆ > αΨ(C−1(1/2)). Thus there is an equilibrium with two parties unconstrained in
campaigning if αΨ(L) ≤ 1 and αΨ(C−1(1/2)) ≤ 1. But note that C(L) > 1/2 implies
that αΨ(C−1(1/2)) > αΨ(L). Thus when C(L) > 1/2, the requirement of non-negative
rents is the binding constraint, and there is an equilibrium with two parties unconstrained
in campaigning if αΨ(C−1(1/2)) ≤ 1.
Finally, to obtain the lower bound on differentiation, ∆, note that we have shown
that when C(L) ≤ 1/2, the binding constraint on differentiation is ∆ ≥ ∆ ≡ αΨ(L), and
14For any given θ2, 1’s vote share mapping m1(θ1; θ2, x) has two kinks, one at t such that
m1(t; θ2, x) ≡ 0 and one at t such that m1(t; θ2, x) ≡ 1. In fact t = v−1
(
v(θ2)−∆2/α
)
< θ2 and
t = v−1 (v(θ2) + ∆(1−∆)/α) > θ2. Thus marginal rent is well defined, continuous and decreasing at
all points θ1 ∈ (t, t). Since the condition for non-negative rents is also imposed for equilibrium, we know
that θ∗1 = θ
∗ is indeed a best response.
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when C(L) > 1/2, the binding constraint on differentiation is ∆ > ∆ ≡ αΨ(C−1(1/2)).
Thus ∆ is increasing in α.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider first C(L) ≤ 1/2. Then b = 1/Ψ(L) and α > b
implies that there does not exist ∆ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∆ ≥ αΨ(L). It follows that in any
equilibrium αΨ(L) > ∆, and therefore – as long as both parties earn non-negative rents
when constrained in campaigning – it must be that θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 = L. Recall that the condition
C(L) ≤ 1/2 guarantees that the set A defined in the proof of Proposition 1 is nonempty.
In particular, then, if C(L) ≤ 1/2 and αΨ(L) > 1 (i.e., α > b) then in all equilibria
the two parties are campaign-constrained. Consider now the case of C(L) > 1/2. Then
b = 1/Ψ(C−1(1/2)) and α > b implies that there does not exist ∆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∆ ≥ αΨ(C−1(1/2)). But ∆ < αΨ(C−1(1/2)) is equivalent to C(θ∗) > 1/2. It follows
that if C(L) > 1/2 and α > b the set A is empty, and there cannot be an equilibrium in
pure strategies with more than one party.
Lemma 3 In (any voting subgame of) any electoral equilibrium, voters vote for their
preferred candidate.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose voter i’s preferred party is k∗(i) ∈ K, and that k˜ ∈ K
and k˜ 6= k∗(i). Let tk(σv−i) denote the number of votes for party k given a voting strategy
profile σv−i for all voters other than i. The payoff for i of voting for k˜ given σ
v
−i, U(k˜;σ
v
−i),
is ∑
k 6=k˜,k∗(i)∈K
tk(σ
v
−i)
N
u(xk; z
i) +
[tk˜(σ
v
−i) + 1]
N
u(xk˜; z
i) +
tk∗(i)(σ
v
−i)
N
u(xk∗(i); z
i).
Similarly, the payoff for i of voting for k∗(i) given σv−i, U(k
∗(i);σv−i), is∑
k 6=k˜,k∗(i)∈K
tk(σ
v
−i)
N
u(xk; z
i) +
tk˜(σ
v
−i)
N
u(xk˜; z
i) +
[tk∗(i)(σ
v
−i) + 1]
N
u(xk∗(i); z
i).
Thus
U(k∗(i);σv−i)− U(k˜;σv−i) =
1
N
[u(xk∗(i); z
i)− u(xk˜; zi)],
which is positive by definition of k∗(i). Since σv−i was arbitrary, this shows that voting
sincerely strictly dominates voting for any other available party and is thus a dominant
strategy for voter i. It follows that in all Nash equilibria in the voting stage voters vote
sincerely among parties contesting the election.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider first interior parties k = 2, . . . , K − 1 and note that
mk(θ, x) ≥ 0 if and only if
θk ≥ v−1
((
δrkv(θ`(k)) + (1− δrk)v(θr(k))
)− δrk(1− δrk)(∆Tk )2
2α
)
≡ θk(θ−k, x). (9)
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But then θk(θ−k, x) < θ if θ`(k) = θr(k) ≤ θ, and this is always the case in a LS equilibrium
with θk < L for interior parties whose neighbors are themselves interior parties since
θ`(k) = θr(k) = θk. Similarly, for interior parties with one extreme neighbor, say k = K−1,
it must be that θk = θ`(k) > θr(k) (θk = θr(k) > θ`(k) for k = 2). For extreme parties this
is also true since in equilibrium they earn nonnegative rents, which can only happen if
they choose a campaign investment above the lower discontinuity point. Now consider
the upper discontinuity point and let j > ` > k. We want to show that if θr = θ for all
r 6= k, then k’s best response θk(θ−k) is lower than the point D`,jk (θ−k) at which x˜k` = x˜j`.
Recall that for r > k, x˜kr = (xk +xr)/2 +α(v(θk)− v(θr))/|xr−xk|. After some algebra,
we obtain
D`,jk (θ−k) = v
−1
( |x` − xk||xj − xk|
2α
− |x` − xk|v(θj)− |xj − xk|v(θ`)
xj − x`
)
(10)
and if θr = θ for all r 6= k, (10) simplifies to
D`,jk (θ) = v
−1
(
v(θ) +
|x` − xk||xj − xk|
2α
)
> θ.
Hence, it follows from (9) and (10) that the vote share is differentiable in [θk(θ, x), Dk(θ)].
The same logic holds for extreme parties. Suppose all interior parties k = 2, . . . , K − 1
choose in equilibrium θ∗ < L. Consider k’s problem. Note that since θ∗j = θ
∗
r for all
j, r 6= k, then k’s FOC is given by 2αv′(θ∗k) = ∆C ′v(θ∗k). By our previous argument, this
is well defined, and since the marginal vote share is decreasing above θk(θ, x), then the
sufficient second order condition is satisfied. Therefore
θ∗k = θ
∗ = Ψ−1
(
∆
2α
)
for all k = 2, . . . , K − 1. (11)
Finally, given that interior parties are choosing θk < L, then optimal campaign spending
by extreme parties must be strictly smaller that L as well. In particular, it must be that
θ∗1 = θ
∗
K = Ψ
−1(∆/α). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix K ≥ 3, and assume that K × C(L) ≤ 1. Lemma
4 shows that if α ≥ a ≡ C(L)/Ψ(L), there exists a short-run LS equilibrium with K ≤
1/C(L) parties, such that θ∗1(α) = θ
∗(α) = L. Lemma 5 shows that if C(L)/2Ψ(L) ≡
a ≤ α ≤ a, there exists a short-run LS equilibrium with K ≤ 1/C(L) parties in which
θ∗1(α) = Ψ
−1(∆/α) < θ∗(α) = L. Lemma 6 shows that if α ≤ a, there exists a short-
run LS equilibrium with K ≤ 1/C(L) parties in which θ∗1(α) = Ψ−1(∆/α) < θ∗(α) =
Ψ−1(∆/2α) < L.
Lemma 4 Take K ≥ 3 as given, and suppose K × C(L) ≤ 1. Then for any α ≥ a,
there exists a short-run LS equilibrium (x∗1(α), θ
∗
1(α),∆
∗(α), θ∗(α)) with K parties such
that θ∗(α) = θ∗1(α) = L, and all parties earn positive rents.
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Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that in equilibrium θ∗k = L for k = 2, . . . , K − 1. For
L to be optimal for k it must be that the marginal vote share given that the other parties
are also choosing L is higher than the marginal cost at L; i.e., 2αv′(L)/∆ ≥ C ′v(L), or
∆ ≤ 2αΨ(L). For nonnegative rents we must have Π∗k = ∆ − C(L) ≥ 0, or ∆ ≥ C(L).
Now consider the extreme parties. For θ∗1 = θ
∗
K = L, it is necessary that ∆ ≤ αΨ(L). For
nonnegative rents it is necessary that Π∗1 = x1 + ∆/2 − C(L) ≥ 0, and since ∆ ≥ C(L)
it is sufficient that x1 ≥ ∆/2. Now 2x1 + (K − 1)∆ = 1, so x1 = (1 − (K − 1)∆)/2.
Substituting, x1 ≥ ∆/2 becomes ∆ ≤ 1/K. Putting everything together implies that in
equilibrium ∆∗ ∈ AT , where
AT ≡ {∆ : C(L) ≤ ∆ ≤ min{αΨ(L), 1/K}}
The set AT is nonempty if and only if K × C(L) ≤ 1 and α ≥ C(L)/Ψ(L) = a. Finally,
note that if ∆∗ is in the interior of AT then all parties earn positive rents.
Lemma 5 Take K ≥ 3 as given, and suppose K × C(L) ≤ 1. Then for any α : a ≤
α ≤ a, there exists a short-run LS equilibrium (x∗1(α), θ∗1(α),∆∗(α), θ∗(α)) with K parties
such that θ∗1(α) = Ψ
−1(∆/α) < θ∗(α) = L, and all parties earn positive rents.
Proof of Lemma 5. The first part of the proof is identical to the proof of Lemma
4. For L to be optimal for k = 2, . . . , K − 1 it must be that ∆ ≤ 2αΨ(L), and for
nonnegative rents for interior parties, we must have ∆ ≥ C(L). For extreme parties
to choose interior campaign spending, i.e., θ∗1 = θ
∗
K = Ψ
−1(∆/α) < L, it must be that
∆ > αΨ(L). For nonnegative rents we need
Π∗1 = Π
∗
K = x1 +
∆
2
− α
∆
[v(L)− v(θ∗1)]− C(θ∗1) ≥ 0.
Since θ∗1 maximizes Π1(θ1), then Π1(θ
∗
1) ≥ Π1(θ1) for all θ1 6= θ∗1, and thus it is enough to
show that Π1(L) ≥ 0. But this is x1 + ∆/2 ≥ C(L), which holds whenever x1 ≥ ∆/2. As
before, this implies ∆ ≤ 1/K. Putting everything together implies that in equilibrium
∆∗ ∈ AM , where
AM ≡ {∆ : max{C(L), αΨ(L)} ≤ ∆ ≤ min{2αΨ(L), 1/K}}
The set AM is nonempty if and only if (1) K ≤ 1/C(L), (2) α ≥ C(L)/2Ψ(L), and (3)
K ≤ 1/αΨ(L). But α ≤ a implies that C(L) ≥ αΨ(L), and the result follows. As in the
previous lemma, note that if ∆∗ is in the interior of AM then all parties earn positive
rents.
Lemma 6 Take K ≥ 3 as given, and suppose K × C(L) ≤ 1. Then
1. For any α ≤ a, there exists a short-run LS equilibrium (x∗1(α), θ∗1(α),∆∗(α), θ∗(α))
with K parties such that θ∗1(α) = Ψ
−1(∆/α) < θ∗(α) = Ψ−1(∆/2α) < L, and all
parties earn positive rents.
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2. For any α ≤ 1/(6Ψ(C−1v (1/3− F ))), there exists a short-run LS equilibrium
(x∗1(α), θ
∗
1(α),∆
∗(α), θ∗(α)) with at least three parties in which θ∗k(α) < L for all k,
and all interior parties earn zero rents.
Proof of Lemma 6. Consider first the interior parties k = 2, . . . , K − 1. If
θ∗j = θ
∗
r < L for all j, r 6= k, then Lemma 1 implies that k’s marginal vote share is
differentiable, and k’s FOC is given by 2αv′(θ∗k)/∆ = C
′
v(θ
∗
k). Therefore,
θ∗k = θ
∗ = Ψ−1
(
∆
2α
)
for all k = 2, . . . , K − 1.
Moreover, since θ∗ ≤ L, it must be that ∆ ≥ 2αΨ(L). Non-negative rents for interior
parties require that Π∗k = ∆ − C(θ∗) ≥ 0 or θ∗ ≤ C−1v (∆ − F ). Substituting θ∗ we get
∆ ≥ 2αΨ(C−1v (∆− F )). And note that 2αΨ(C−1v (∆− F )) ≥ 2αΨ(L) if and only if ∆ ≤
C(L). Then, as long as in equilibrium ∆ ≤ C(L) (i.e., Πk(L) ≤ 0 for k = 2, . . . , K − 1),
∆ ≥ 2αΨ(C−1v (∆−F )) implies ∆ ≥ 2αΨ(L). That is, if interior parties earn nonnegative
rents, they are choosing θ∗ < L. Therefore in equilibrium either 2αΨ(C−1v (∆ − F )) ≤
∆ ≤ C(L) or ∆ ≥ max{C(L), 2αΨ(L)}. Consider next optimality and nonnegative rents
for extreme parties. Note first that given that interior parties are choosing θ∗ < L, then
optimal campaign spending by extreme parties must be interior as well. For nonnegative
rents we need Π∗1 = x1 + ∆/2− α/∆(v(θ∗)− v(θ∗1))− C(θ∗1) ≥ 0. Since Π∗1 is maximized
at θ∗1, then Π
∗
1(θ
∗
1) ≥ Π∗1(θ1) for all θ1 6= θ∗1 and, as a result, it suffices to show that
Π∗1(θ
∗) > 0, or equivalently, (K − 2)∆/2 +C(θ∗) ≤ 1/2. But since in equilibrium it must
be that ∆ ≥ C(θ∗), then it is sufficient that ∆ ≤ 1/K.
Putting everything together, then in equilibrium either 2αΨ(C−1v (∆ − F )) ≤ ∆ ≤
min{C(L), 1/K} or max{C(L), 2αΨ(L)} ≤ ∆ ≤ 1/K. To conclude the proof of part
(1), consider the latter case. There exists such a ∆ iff (1) K ≤ 1/C(L), and (2) K ≤
1/(2αΨ(L)). But α ≤ a implies C(L) ≥ 2αΨ(L), and the result follows. Moreover, if
the above inequalities are strict, then all parties earn positive rents. To conclude the
proof of part (2), consider instead an equilibrium in which 2αΨ(C−1v (∆ − F )) ≤ ∆ ≤
min{C(L), 1/K}. There exists such a ∆ iff (1) K ≤ 1/C(L), and (2) 2αΨ(C−1v (∆−F )) ≤
∆. Note that the right-hand side is increasing in ∆, and the left-hand side is decreasing
in ∆. With ∆ = 1/K, this is 2αΨ(C−1v (1/K − F )) ≤ 1/K. Note that if this is satisfied
for some K ≥ 3, it is satisfied for K = 3. Then we need 2αΨ(C−1v (1/3−F )) ≤ 1/3. But
this is the same as α ≤ 1/(6Ψ(C−1v (1/3− F ))).
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof follows from Propositions 8 and 9.
Proposition 8 Suppose that 2× C(L) ≤ 1 and 2× F ≥ 1/2. Then there exists a long-
run electoral equilibrium with two parties. Moreover, there exist a threshold α2P and, for
any α, a long-run two-party electoral equilibrium (x∗1(α),∆
∗(α), θ∗(α)) such that
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1. If α ≤ α2P , then both parties campaign unconstrained, and campaign spending is
decreasing in parties’ ideological differentiation and voters’ ideological focus i.e.,
θ∗(α) = Ψ−1(∆/α) < L.
2. If α > α2P , then both parties are campaign constrained, i.e., θ
∗(α) = L.
Proof of Proposition 8. Follows from Lemma 2 (in the text) and Lemma 7.
Lemma 7 Suppose that 2×C(L) ≤ 1 and 2×F ≥ 1/2. Then for any α > α2P there exists
a long-run two-party electoral equilibrium (x∗1(α),∆
∗(α), θ∗(α)) such that both parties are
campaign-constrained; i.e., θ∗(α) = L.
Proof of Lemma 7. We showed in the proof of Proposition 2 that if two parties
compete for votes in the election, and (i) voters vote for their preferred party, (ii) both
parties are constrained in campaign spending; i.e., θ∗ = L, and (iii) parties’ ideological
differentiation is ∆ < αΨ(L), then there is a location of the left party x1 such that a
short-run electoral equilibrium exists. We next show that if conditions (i) and (ii) are
satisfied, and parties’ ideological differentiation ∆ ∈ B∗2P , where
B∗2P ≡ {∆ : 1− 2F ≤ ∆ ≤ min{αΨ(L), 2C(L), 1− 2Cv(L)}} ,
then there is a location of the left party x1 such that a long-run electoral equilibrium
exists. It is then easy to check that the conditions in the hypothesis imply that B∗2P is
nonempty. Consider then the threat of entry. Suppose j enters at xj ∈ (0, x1). As before,
θˆ1 = θˆ2 = L is a mutual best response if ∆/2 ≥ Cv(L). Now, given that θˆ1 = θˆ2 = θˆj = L
we have that r˜j = (xj + x2)/2 and ˜`j = (x1 + xj)/2. But then
Πj(θˆj) =
∆
2
− C(L) < 0⇔ ∆ < 2C(L).
Since θˆ1 = θˆ2 = L, a sufficient condition to deter entry in [0, x1] is x1 ≤ F . Similarly
1 − x2 ≤ F prevents entry in [1 − x2, 1]. Since ∆ = 1 − [x1 + (1 − x2)], this requires
∆ ≥ 1− 2F . This gives B∗2P .
Proposition 9 Take K ≥ 3 as given. If K × C(L) ≤ 1, and K × F ≥ 1/2 there exists
a long-run LS equilibrium with K parties. Moreover, there exist α, α and, for any α a
long-run LS equilibrium (x∗1(α), θ
∗
1(α),∆
∗(α), θ∗(α)) such that
1. If α ≤ α, then all parties campaign unconstrained, and for every party k, campaign
spending is decreasing in parties’ ideological differentiation and voters’ ideological
focus i.e., θ∗1(α) = Ψ
−1(∆/α) < θ∗(α) = Ψ−1(∆/2α) < L.
2. If α ≤ α ≤ α, then only interior parties are campaign constrained, i.e., θ∗1(α) =
Ψ−1(∆/α) < θ∗(α) = L, and if α ≥ α all parties are campaign constrained, i.e.,
θ∗1(α) = θ
∗(α) = L.
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Proof of Proposition 9. Fix K ≥ 3, and assume that K × C(L) ≤ 1 and
K × F ≤ 1/2. Lemma 8 extends Lemma 4 to long-run equilibria, and shows that if
α ≥ max
{
C(L)
Ψ(L)
,
1− 2F
(K − 1)Ψ(L)
}
≡ α,
there exists a long-run LS equilibrium with K parties, such that θ∗1(α) = θ
∗(α) = L.
Similarly, Lemma 9 extends Lemma 5 to long-run equilibria, and shows that if
α ≡ max
{
1− 2F
2Ψ(L)(K − 1) ,
C(L)
2Ψ(L)
}
≤ α ≤ α,
there exists a long-run LS equilibrium with K parties in which θ∗1(α) = Ψ
−1(∆/α) <
θ∗(α) = L. Finally, Lemma 10 extends the corresponding Lemma 6 to long-run equilibria
and shows that if α ≤ α, there exists a long-run LS equilibrium with K parties in which
θ∗1(α) = Ψ
−1(∆/α) < θ∗(α) = Ψ−1(∆/2α) < L.
Lemma 8 Take K ≥ 3 as given. If K × C(L) ≤ 1 and K × F ≥ 1/2, then for any
α ≥ α , there exists a LS equilibrium (x∗1(α), θ∗1(α),∆∗(α), θ∗(α)) with K parties such
that θ∗(α) = θ∗1(α) = L, and all parties earn positive rents.
Proof of Lemma 8. We showed in the proof of Lemma 4 that if (i) voters vote for
their preferred party, (ii) all parties are campaign constrained, i.e., θ∗k = L for all k, and
(iii) parties’ ideological differentiation ∆ ∈ AT = {∆ : C(L) ≤ ∆ ≤ min{αΨ(L), 1/K}},
then a short-run LS electoral equilibrium exists. We show below that if conditions (i)
and (ii) are satisfied, and (iii’) parties’ ideological differentiation ∆ ∈ A∗T ⊂ AT , where
A∗T ≡
{
∆ : max
{
1− 2F
(K − 1) , C(L)
}
≤ ∆ ≤ min
{
2C(L), αΨ(L),
1
K
}}
,
then a long-run electoral equilibrium exists. Moreover, if the inequalities are strict (if ∆
is in the interior of A∗T ) then all parties earn positive rents. Note that A
∗
T is nonempty
iff
α ≥ max
{
C(L)
Ψ(L)
,
1− 2F
K − 1Ψ(L)
}
= α (12)
and
max
{
Cv(L) + 1/2
C(L)
,
1
2F
}
≤ K ≤ 1
C(L)
. (13)
Now, (Cv(L)+1/2)/C(L) ≤ 1/2F if and only if F ≤ 1/2, but this must surely be the case,
since forK ≥ 3, the RHS of (13) implies C(L) ≤ 1/3. Thus (13) boils down toKC(L) ≤ 1
and KF ≥ 1/2. Consider then the entry of j at xj ∈ (xk, xk+1) for k = 1, . . . , K − 1.
Since in equilibrium θ∗k = L for k = 1, . . . , K, then as long as incumbents do not prefer
to quit campaigning after j’s entry, we can always sustain in the continuation game an
equilibrium such that θˆj = θˆk = L for all j, k. For incumbents to prefer not to quit
campaigning it is enough that ∆/2 ≥ Cv(L), or ∆ ≥ 2Cv(L). But since Cv(L) < F by
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hypothesis, this is implied by ∆ > C(L). Given θˆj = θˆk = L, j’s entry is not profitable
if Πˆj = ∆/2 − C(L) < 0, or equivalently ∆ < 2C(L). For no profitable entry of (more)
extreme parties it is enough that x1 ≤ F , since θˆj ≤ θˆ1 implies that in the continuation
after entry x˜1j < (x1 + xj)/2 < x1. Substituting x1 = 1− xK = (1− (K − 1)∆)/2, this
is ∆ ≥ (1 − 2F )/(K − 1). Together, these conditions imply that in equilibrium it must
be that ∆ ∈ A∗T .
Lemma 9 Take K ≥ 3 as given. If K × C(L) ≤ 1 and K × F ≥ 1/2, then for any
α ∈ [α, α], there exists a LS equilibrium (x∗1(α), θ∗1(α),∆∗(α), θ∗(α)) with K parties such
that θ∗1(α) = Ψ
−1(∆/α) < θ∗(α) = L, and all parties earn positive rents.
Proof. We showed in Lemma 5 that if (i) voters vote for their preferred party, (ii)
parties are campaign constrained if and only if they are not extreme, i.e., θ∗k = L if
and only if k = 2, . . . , K − 1, and (iii) parties’ ideological differentiation ∆ ∈ AM =
{∆ : max{C(L), αΨ(L)} ≤ ∆ ≤ min{2αΨ(L), 1/K}}, then a a short-run LS electoral
equilibrium exists. We next show that if conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied, and parties’
ideological differentiation ∆ ∈ A∗M ⊂ AM , where
A∗M ≡
{
∆ : max
{
1− 2F
K − 1 , C(L), αΨ(L)
}
≤ ∆ ≤ min
{
2C(L),
1− 2Cv(L)
K − 1 ,
1
K
, 2αΨ(L)
}}
,
then a long-run electoral equilibrium exists. Moreover, if the inequalities are strict (if ∆
is in the interior of A∗M) then all parties earn positive rents. Note that since C(L) ≤ 1/K
and F ≥ 1/2K imply that (1− 2Cv(L))/(K − 1) ≥ 1/K, the conditions defining A∗M are
equivalent to those defining A∗T in all but the α terms. It follows from this that A
∗
M is
nonempty if and only if
1
2F
≤ K ≤ 1
C(L)
and
max
{
(1− 2F )
2Ψ(L)(K − 1) ,
C(L)
2Ψ(L)
}
≤ α ≤ min
{
1
KΨ(L)
,
1− 2Cv(L)
(K − 1)Ψ(L) ,
2C(L)
Ψ(L)
}
. (14)
Now, the LHS of (14) is equal to α by definition. Simple algebra shows (using the
conditions C(L)K ≤ 1 and KF ≥ 1/2) that the RHS of (14) is bigger than α. Consider
then the threat of entry. As in the previous lemma, to deter entry by j at xj ∈ (xk, xk+1)
it is enough that 2Cv(L) ≤ ∆ < 2C(L) and Cv(L) ≤ x1. To deter entry of more extreme
parties, a sufficient condition is x1 ≤ F , and 2Cv(L) ≤ ∆ (recall that this guarantees
that the extreme incumbent parties will not quit campaigning in the continuation game).
Since Cv(L) ≤ F by hypothesis, this is implied by ∆ ≥ C(L). Substituting ∆0 =
(1− (K − 1)∆)/2 and collecting the relevant inequalities gives A∗M .
Lemma 10 Take K ≥ 3 as given. If K × C(L) ≤ 1 and K × F ≥ 1/2, then for any
α ≤ α there exists a LS equilibrium (x∗1(α), θ∗1(α),∆∗(α), θ∗(α)) with K parties such that
θ∗1(α) = Ψ
−1(∆/α) < θ∗(α) = Ψ−1(∆/2α) < L, and all parties earn positive rents.
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Proof. We showed in Lemma 6 that if (i) voters vote for their preferred candidate,
(ii) parties are unconstrained in campaign spending and choose
θ∗k = θ
∗ = Ψ−1
(
∆
2α
)
for all k = 2, . . . , K − 1, and θ∗1 = θ∗K = Ψ−1
(
∆
α
)
,
and (iii) candidate’s differentiation ∆ ∈ AL ≡ {∆ : max{C(L), 2αΨ(L)} ≤ ∆ ≤ 1/K},
the polity is in a short-run LS electoral equilibrium. We next show that if conditions (i)
and (ii) are satisfied, and (iii’) candidate’s differentiation ∆ ∈ A∗L ⊂ AL, where
A∗L ≡
{{
2Cv(L),
1− 2F
K − 1 , C(L), 2αΨ(L)
}
≤ ∆ ≤
{
2C(L),
1− 2Cv(L)
K − 1 ,
1
K
, 2F
}}
then a long-run electoral equilibrium. Moreover, if the inequalities are strict (if ∆ is in
the interior of A∗M) then all parties earn positive rents. Note that the conditions defining
A∗L are equivalent to those defining A
∗
M in all but the α terms and the 2F term on the
RHS (recall that C(L) ≤ 1/K and F ≥ 1/2K imply 2Cv(L) < C(L)). Thus it follows
that A∗L is nonempty if
1
2F
≤ K ≤ 1
Cv(L) + F
,
and
α ≤ min
{
C(L)
Ψ(L)
,
1− 2Cv(L)
2(K − 1)Ψ(L) ,
1
2KΨ(L)
,
F
Ψ(L)
}
. (15)
Simple algebra shows (using the conditions C(L)K ≤ 1 and KF ≥ 1/2) that the RHS
of (15) is bigger than α. Consider then the threat of entry. To deter entry of more
extreme parties it is sufficient that x1 < F , and since x1 = (1 − (K − 1)∆)/2 this can
be written as ∆ > (1 − 2F )/(K − 1). So suppose that j enters at xj ∈ (xk, xk+1) for
k = 1, . . . , K − 1, and define δrj ≡ (xk+1 − xj)/∆. Suppose first that in the continuation
θˆk = θˆk+1 = θˆj = L. Then it must be that
αv′(L)
[
1
δrj∆
+
1
∆
]
≥ C ′v(L) and αv′(L)
[
1
(1− δrj )∆
+
1
∆
]
≥ C ′v(L).
Then if δrj ≥ 1/2 (j enters in (xk, xk+1) closer to xk than to xk+1) the first two inequalities
above hold if and only if ∆ ≤ αΨ(L)(1 + 1/δrj ), or δrj ≤ αΨ(L)/(∆− αΨ(L)). Thus, the
continuation strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium for 1/2 ≤ δrj ≤ αΨ(L)/(∆− αΨ(L)),
which is feasible if and only if ∆ ≤ 3αΨ(L). When instead δrj ≤ 1/2 (j enters closer to
xk) then we need ∆ ≤ αΨ(L)(1+1/(1−δrj )), or δrj ≥ (∆−2αΨ(L))/(∆−αΨ(L)). Thus,
the continuation strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium for (∆−2αΨ(L))/(∆−αΨ(L)) ≤
δrj ≤ 1/2, which is feasible if and only if ∆ ≤ 3αΨ(L). Therefore, the strategy profile
θˆk = θˆk+1 = θˆj = L is a Nash equilibrium in the continuation for entrants such that
∆− 2αΨ(L)
∆− αΨ(L) ≤ δ
r
j ≤
αΨ(L)
∆− αΨ(L) , (16)
where 2αΨ(L) < ∆ ≤ 3αΨ(L). Since the entrant in this case obtains Πj(θˆj) = ∆/2 −
C(L), then as long as in equilibrium ∆ < 2C(L), entry in an “interior” region as in
31
(16) is not profitable. It should be clear that this rules out “interior” entrants only, since
2αΨ(L) < ∆ with (16) implies that δrj ∈ (0, 1). Consider then δrj > (αΨ(L))/(∆−αΨ(L))
(j enters close to xk; the other case is symmetric). Consider the continuation θˆk = θˆj = L,
θˆk+1 = Ψ
−1(δrj∆/((1 + δ
r
j )α)) < L. This is clearly an equilibrium in the continuation (j
and k have even a greater incentive to choose L than in the previous case since they are
now closer substitutes). For entry not to be profitable, we need
Πj(θˆj) =
∆
2
+
α
δrj∆
[v(L)− v(θˆk+1)]− C(L) < 0.
A sufficient condition for the above inequality to be true is ∆ ≤ 2F . To see this,
suppose that the division of the electorate between k and j were fixed, with cutpoint
x˜kj = (xk+xj)/2. Then j would optimally choose θ˜j = Ψ
−1(δrj∆/α) < θˆk+1, and we have
that
Πj(θˆj) ≤ ∆
2
− α
δrj∆
[v(θˆk+1)− v(θ˜j)]− [Cv(θ˜j) + F ] < ∆
2
− [Cv(θ˜j) + F ].
To assure that all incumbent parties do not prefer to quit campaigning upon entry in
any continuation, it is sufficient that min{x1,∆/2} ≥ Cv(L). Since 2x1 + (K − 1)∆ = 1,
then x1 = (1− (K − 1)∆)/2, and the previous condition can be written as
2Cv(L) ≤ ∆ ≤ 1− 2Cv(L)
K − 1 .
Collecting the relevant inequalities gives A∗L.
Proof of Proposition 4. In the proof of Lemma 2 we showed that ∆ < 1−2Cv(L) is
a sufficient condition to guarantee that incumbent parties do not quit campaigning upon
entry of a centrist challenger. It turns out that, in all electoral equilibria where incumbent
parties earn positive rents, this condition is also necessary for existence of a long-run pure-
strategy electoral equilibrium. To see why this is the case, first notice that the definition
of long-run equilibrium requires incumbent parties to deter the entry of any challenger,
and therefore also the entry of a centrist challenger championing an ideological position
xj arbitrarily close to an incumbent’s position. For example, suppose that xj > x1 but
xj → x1, and therefore the entrant and party 1 are almost “perfect substitutes” in the
voters’ eyes. In this case it cannot be that both j and 1 choose an interior campaign
spending in the continuation game. In fact, if that were the case either party could deviate
and increase discretely its vote share by increasing its campaign spending slightly above
the opponent’s level. As a consequence, in any continuation equilibrium in pure strategies
upon entry of a close centrist challenger, either both parties are campaign constrained at
L or the incumbent keeps spending at his equilibrium level θ∗ and the entrant optimally
chooses not to campaign. The latter case, however, cannot be optimal either when the
entrant is arbitrarily close to an incumbent party earning positive rents in equilibrium. In
fact the entrant can always choose a campaign level slighty above its closest competitor
and de facto attract the votes of all the incumbent supporters. Since the incumbent was
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earning strictly positive rents in equilibrium, this strategy is indeed profitable for the
entrant. Summarizing, when incumbent parties are earning positive rents in equilibrium,
it must be the case that upon entry of a centrist challenger very close to an incumbent
party, the only continuation equilibrium in pure strategies has both parties constrained
in campaigning, which implies that ∆ < 1 − 2Cv(L) becomes a necessary condition to
guarantee that incumbent parties do not quit campaigning in the continuation game.
Since the necessary condition ∆ < 1− 2Cv(L) provides un upper bound on differenti-
ation as a function of the level of campaign regulation, it is natural to ask whether there
exist also a lower bound on ideological differentiation between parties. To answer this
question, notice that when ∆ < αΨ(L) it must be the case that parties are costrained in
campaigning in equilibrium. This implies that when incumbents are relatively close ideo-
logically we can use an argument similar to the one above and conclude that, upon entry
of an extreme challenger (xj < x1 or x2 > xj) that is arbitrarily close to an incumbent,
∆ > 2Cv(L) guarantees that incumbents do not quit campaigning in any continuation
game. When voters are sufficiently responsive to campaign, i.e., when α > 2Cv(L)/Ψ(L),
we have that 2Cv(L) < αΨ(L) and hence ∆ > 2Cv(L) becomes a necessary condition
when parties are relatively close ideologically, i.e., when ∆ < αΨ(L). Summarizing, when
incumbent parties are earning positive rents in equilibrium and voters’ are sufficiently
responsive to campaigning it must be that 2Cv(L) < ∆ < 1− 2Cv(L) and, as campaign
limits become less and less stringent, it is immediate to verify that parties’ ideological
positions must converge to x1 = 1− x2 = 1/4.
Proof of Proposition 5. We already proved in the text the second part of the
proposition. To prove the first part, consider two parties representing policy positions
x1, x2 = x1 + ∆ with campaign investment θ1 and θ2, and such that n1 ≤ Nx˜12 voters
vote for party 1, n2 ≤ N (1− x˜12) vote for party 2, respectively. We show that abstainers
must be be centrist. We begin by computing the net benefit of voting for a voter with
ideal policy x ≤ x˜12 in a two-party equilibrium. Given a total turnout of n1 + n2 ≤ N
voters, the expected utility of x < x˜12 is
n1u (θ1, x1;x) + n2u (θ2, x2;x)
n1 + n2
− τ,
if he votes (for party 1), and
(n1 − 1)u (θ1, x1;x) + n2u (θ2, x2;x)
n1 + n2 − 1
if he does not vote. Hence, the net benefit of voting for x < x˜12 is
n2 (u (θ1, x1;x)− u (θ2, x2;x))
(n1 + n2) (n1 + n2 − 1) − τ.
Since u (θi, xi;x)− u (θj, xj;x) = 2 (xj − xi) (x˜ij − x), the last expression simplifies to
2
n2∆ (x˜12 − x)
(n1 + n2) (n1 + n2 − 1) − τ, (17)
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which is decreasing in x < x˜12. Likewise, we can compute the net benefit of voting for
x > x˜12 (a potential supporter of party 2), which equals
2
n1∆ (x− x˜12)
(n1 + n2) (n1 + n2 − 1) − τ, (18)
and it is increasing in x > x˜12. As a consequence, abstainers must have ideological
positions in an interval
(
x˜l12, x˜
r
12
)
around that of the individual who is indifferent between
parties, i.e. x˜12. Hence, abstainers must be centrists. From (17) and (18), we obtain that
x˜l12, and x˜
r
12 are given by the system of equations
2
(1−x˜r12)∆(x˜12−x˜l12)
N(x˜l12+1−x˜r12)(x˜l12+1−x˜r12− 1N )
= τ
2
x˜l12∆(x˜r12−x˜12)
N(x˜l12+1−x˜r12)(x˜l12+1−x˜r12− 1N )
= τ,
which is identical to system (7). Since we did not assume symmetry, it follows that
location symmetry does not play any role and all results derived in the text hold for all
short-run electoral equilibria with two parties.
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider an electoral equilibrium with three parties
representing policy positions x1 = ∆0, x2 = x1 + ∆1 and x3 = x2 + ∆2, and campaign
investment θ1, θ2 and θ3. For j = 1, 2, 3, let nj denote the number of voters voting for
party j. Consider first the problem of a voter with ideal policy x ≤ x˜12. The expected
payoff of voting (for party 1) is ∑3
i=1 niu (θi, xi;x)∑3
i=1 ni
− τ.
On the other hand, the expected payoff of abstaining is
(n1 − 1)u (θ1, x1;x) +
∑3
i=2 niu (θi, xi;x)∑3
i=1 ni − 1
.
Hence the net benefit of voting is
(n2 + n3) (u (θ1, x1;x)− u (θ2, x2;x)) + n3 (u (θ2, x2;x)− u (θ3, x3;x))(∑3
i=1 ni
) (∑3
i=1 ni − 1
) − τ.
Since u (θi, xi;x)−u (θj, xj;x) = 2 (xj − xi) (x˜ij − x), the last expression simplifies to
A(x) ≡ 2(n2 + n3) ∆1 (x˜12 − x) + n3∆2 (x˜23 − x)(∑3
i=1 ni
) (∑3
i=1 ni − 1
) − τ. (19)
Likewise, we can compute the net benefit of voting for an individual with ideal policy
x ∈ (x˜12, x˜23) (a potential supporter of party 2). This is given by
B(x) ≡ 2n1∆1 (x− x˜12) + n3∆2 (x˜23 − x)(∑3
i=1 ni
) (∑3
i=1 ni − 1
) − τ, (20)
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Finally, the net benefit of voting for an individual with ideal policy x ∈ (x˜23, 1) (a
potential supporter of party 3) is
C(x) ≡ 2(n1 + n2) ∆2 (x− x˜23) + n1∆1 (x− x˜12)(∑3
i=1 ni
) (∑3
i=1 ni − 1
) − τ. (21)
Note that A(x) is decreasing in x for all x ≤ x˜12, C(x) is increasing in x for all
x ∈ (x˜23, 1), and B(x) is increasing in x for all x ∈ (x˜12, x˜23) if n1∆1 > n3∆2, and
decreasing in x for all x ∈ (x˜12, x˜23) otherwise. We then have three cases:
i) n1∆1 > n3∆2. In this case min{C(x) : x ∈ (x˜23, 1)} = C(x˜23) ≥ max{B(x) : x ∈
(x˜12, x˜23)} = B(x˜23) ≥ min{B(x) : x ∈ (x˜12, x˜23)} = B(x˜12) = min{A(x) : x ≤
x˜12} = A(x˜12). As a consequence there will be abstention in a neighborhood of x˜12,
and n1∆1 > n3∆2 can be rewritten as x˜
`
12∆1 > (1− x˜23)∆2.
ii) n1∆1 < n3∆2. In this case min{A(x) : x ≤ x˜12} = A(x˜12) ≥ max{B(x) : x ∈
(x˜12, x˜23)} = B(x˜12) ≥ min{B(x) : x ∈ (x˜12, x˜23)} = B(x˜23) = min{C(x) : x ∈
(x˜23, 1)} = C(x˜23). As a consequence there will be abstention in a neighborhood of
x˜23, and n1∆1 < n3∆2 can be rewritten as x˜12∆1 < (1− x˜r23)∆2.
iii) n1∆1 = n3∆2. In this case B(x) = B for all x ∈ (x˜12, x˜23), and B < min{A(x) : x ≤
x˜12}, B < min{C(x) : x ∈ (x˜23, 1)}. This implies that there cannot be abstainers
among the supporters of the extreme parties otherwise all centrist supporters will
abstain and this is inconsistent with equilibrium. Hence, either B > 0 and in this
case there will not be abstention in equilibrium, or it is exactly equal to zero. In this
latter case there will be abstention of a subset of centrist voters, and n1∆1 = n3∆2
can be rewritten as x˜12∆1 = (1− x˜23)∆2 and it is verified in the case of a location-
symmetric equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 7. First note that for small cost of voting τ , either condition
(i) or (ii) of Proposition 6 will hold generically. Formally, for any population size N and
party configuration D ≡ {x1,∆1,∆2}, there exists a τ(N,D) > 0 such that for any two
τ, τ ′ ≤ τ(N,D), [n1(τ,N)∆1−n3(τ,N)∆2]× [n1(τ ′, N)∆1−n3(τ ′, N)∆2] > 0, where nj(·)
denotes the number of individuals voting for party j in equilibrium. Assume then that
τ < τ(N,D), and without loss of generality, also that n1(τ,N)∆1−n3(τ,N)∆2 > 0. Note
that Proposition 6 implies that in this case abstention occurs in an interval
(
x˜`12, x˜
r
12
)
around x˜12. As a result, we can rewrite n1(τ,N)∆1 > n3(τ,N)∆2 as x˜
`
12(τ,N)∆1 >
(1− x˜23(τ,N)) ∆2, or simply as x˜`12∆1 > (1− x˜23) ∆2.
Note that since x˜`12 (x˜
r
12) denotes the ideology of the voter who is indifferent between
abstaining and voting for candidate 1 (2), it must be the case that x˜`12 ≤ x˜12 ≤ x˜r12. In
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particular, x˜`12 and x˜
r
12 are given by the (unique) solution of system (22).
15

(1−x˜r12)(x˜12−x˜l12)∆1+(1−x˜23)(x˜23−x˜`12)∆2
N(1−(x˜r12−x˜`12))(1−(x˜r12−x˜`12)− 1N )
= τ
2
x˜`12(x˜r12−x˜12)∆1+(1−x˜23)(x˜23−x˜r12)∆2
N(1−(x˜r12−x˜l12))(1−(x˜r12−x˜l12)− 1N )
= τ
2
.
(22)
Assume from now on that voting is almost costless. Note that in this case x˜`12 → x˜12 and
x˜r12 → x˜12, so that turnout t = 1− (x˜r12 − x˜`12)→ 1.
First, we show that turnout is decreasing in θ1. Note that x˜
`
12 < x˜12 if and only if
x˜12∆1 > (1− x˜23) ∆2, which is implied by x˜`12∆1 > (1− x˜23) ∆2. Evaluating the total
differential of the two equations in system (22) with almost costless voting yields
∂x˜r12
∂θ1
=
x˜12 (∆1 (1− x˜12) + (1− x˜23) ∆2) + τ(2N−1)2
((1− x˜12) ∆1 + (1− x˜23) ∆2) (x˜12∆1 − (1− x˜23) ∆2) + τ(2N−1)2 ∆1
∆1
∂x˜12
∂θ1
> 0
∂x˜`12
∂θ1
=
(1− x˜12) (x˜12∆1 − (1− x˜23) ∆2) + τ(2N−1)2
((1− x˜12) ∆1 + (1− x˜23) ∆2) (x˜12∆1 − (1− x˜23) ∆2) + τ(2N−1)2 ∆1
∆1
∂x˜12
∂θ1
> 0,
from where it follows that
∂x˜r12
∂θ1
> ∂x˜12
∂θ1
>
∂x˜`12
∂θ1
. Using this we can show that campaign
spending of party 1 in equilibrium must be higher with voluntary voting than with
compulsory voting. Notice that
∂m1 (θ, x, τ)
∂θ1
=
∂
x˜`12
t
∂θ1
=
∂x˜`12
∂θ1
t+ x˜l12
(
∂x˜r12
∂θ1
− ∂x˜`12
∂θ1
)
t2
and that
∂m1 (θ, x, τ)
∂θ1
>
∂x˜12
∂θ1
if and only if
∂x˜`12
∂θ1
t+ x˜l12
(
∂x˜r12
∂θ1
− ∂x˜
`
12
∂θ1
)
> t2
∂x˜12
∂θ1
,
which is always true in the case of almost costless voting. Since x˜`12/t is the vote share of
party 1, it follows that the marginal return of campaign spending with voluntary voting
15Note that (22) admits a unique solution. By subtracting the second equation of (22) from the first
and substituting turnout t = 1− (x˜r12 − x˜`12), we have that x˜`12 (t) = tx˜12 + (1− t) (1− x˜23) ∆2∆1 , which is
increasing in t since x˜12∆1 > x˜`12∆1 > (1− x˜23) ∆2. Plugging this in the second equation of (22) we get
x˜r12 (t) = x˜12 +
τt(Nt−1)
2 − (1− x˜23) (x˜23 − x˜12) ∆2
t (x˜12∆1 − (1− x˜23) ∆2) ,
which is also increasing in t. Hence, existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system (22) follows
from the fact that 1− t− x˜r12 (t) + x˜l12 (t) = 0 has a unique solution.
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is higher than with compulsory voting, and therefore that campaign spending of party 1
in equilibrium must be higher with voluntary voting than with compulsory voting.
Proceeding in a similar way we can compare the marginal return of campaign spending
when voting is voluntary and compulsory for parties 2 and 3. First note that
∂x˜r12
∂θ2
=
(1− 2 (x˜23 − x˜12)) ((1− x˜12) ∆1 + (1− x˜23) ∆2) + τ(2N−1)2
(x˜12∆1 − (1− x˜23) ∆2) ((1− x˜12) ∆1 + (1− x˜23) ∆2) + τ(2N−1)2 ∆1
∂x˜12
∂θ2
∆1
∂x˜`12
∂θ2
=
2 (x˜23 − x˜12) (x˜12∆1 − (1− x˜23) ∆2) + τ(2N−1)2
(x˜12∆1 − (1− x˜23) ∆2) ((1− x˜12) ∆1 + (1− x˜23) ∆2) + τ(2N−1)2 ∆1
∂x˜12
∂θ2
∆1 < 0,
where we used the fact that
x˜12 =
x1 + x2
2
+ α
v (θ1)− v (θ2)
∆1
, x˜23 =
x2 + x3
2
+ α
v (θ2)− v (θ3)
∆2
, and
∂x˜12
∂θ2
= −αv
′ (θ2)
∆1
= −∆2
∆1
∂x˜23
∂θ2
.
Note then that ∂m2(θ,x,τ)
∂θ2
=
∂((x˜23−x˜r12)/t)
∂θ2
> ∂x˜23
∂θ2
− ∂x˜12
∂θ2
if and only if
∂x˜r12
∂θ2
+ (x˜23 − x˜12)
(
∂x˜`12
∂θ2
− ∂x˜
r
12
∂θ2
)
<
∂x˜12
∂θ2
,
or equivalently,
∆1 (x˜23 − x˜12) > (1− x˜23) (∆1 + ∆2) . (23)
Proceeding similarly, for party 3, we have that
∂m3 (θ, x, τ)
∂θ3
=
∂
(
1−x˜23
t
)
∂θ3
= −∂x˜23
∂θ3
− (1− x˜23)
(
∂x˜`12
∂θ3
− ∂x˜
r
12
∂θ3
)
> −∂x˜23
∂θ3
if and only if
x˜23 − x˜12 > 1− x˜23. (24)
Note that (24) holds whenever (23) does. It follows that if (23) holds, the marginal return
of campaign spending with voluntary voting is higher than with compulsory voting for
all parties. This implies that when voting is voluntary, campaign spending of all parties
must be higher in equilibrium than when voting is compulsory.
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Next, note that since θ2 > θk for k = 1, 3 in any three party equilibrium with compul-
sory voting, then in equilibrium x˜23(θ) > x23 ≡ x2+x32 , and x˜12(θ) < x12 ≡ x1+x22 . Thus
to establish that (23) holds it is enough to show that
∆1 (x23 − x12) > (1− x23) (∆1 + ∆2) ,
or substituting, (
x2 − 1
2
)
+
(
x3 − x1
2
)
>
1
2
. (25)
Thus when asymmetry
(
x2 − 12
)
and polarization
(
x3−x1
2
)
are sufficiently high, all parties
spend more in campaigning when voting is voluntary than when it is compulsory (note
there exist multiple asymmetry/polarization configurations that satisfy this inequality).
7 Appendix B
Consider two parties k and j > k representing policy positions xk and xj > xk and
investing θk and θj, respectively. Recall that there always exists a unique policy x˜kj such
that a voter i with ideal policy zi = x˜kj would be completely indifferent between parties
k and j,
x˜kj =
xk + xj
2
+ α
v(θk)− v(θj)
|xj − xk| . (26)
For k < K, let rk(θ, x) ≡ arg minj>k{x˜kj(θ, x)} denote the identity of k’s relevant
competitor to the right given (x, θ), and let r˜k(θ, x) ≡ minj>k{x˜kj(θ, x)} denote the
position of the voter that is indifferent between k and rk(θ, x). Similarly, for k > 1,
define `k(θ, x) ≡ arg maxj<k{x˜jk(θ, x)} and ˜`k(θ, x) ≡ maxj<k{x˜jk(θ, x)}. For k = 1, let
˜`
k(θ, x) ≡ 0, and for k = K, let r˜k(θ, x) ≡ 1. Let then ∆k(θ, x) ≡ xr(k) − x`(k) denote
the distance between the policy positions represented by rk(θ, x) and `k(θ, x), and let
δrk ≡ (xr(k) − xk)/∆k. Then for any given (θ, x), as long as 0 < ˜`k(θ, x) < r˜k(θ, x) < 1,
party k’s vote share is given by
mk(θ, x) = r˜k(θ, x)− ˜`k(θ, x).
As we already mentioned before, the vote share mk as a function of θk will typi-
cally have one or more points of non-differentiability. Clearly, the first such point is at
the value θk(θ−k, x) for which mk(θ, x) = 0 for θk < θk(θ−k, x) and mk(θ, x) > 0 for
θk ≥ θk(θ−k, x); i.e., the minimum campaign investment at which k obtains some votes.
However, provided that θk ≥ θk(θ−k, x) and given the identity of k’s relevant competitors
38
for (x, θ−k), the vote share of an interior party 1 < k < K is
mk(θk; θ−k, x) =
∆k
2
+
α
∆k
(
v(θk)− v(θr(k))
δrk
+
v(θk)− v(θ`(k))
(1− δrk)
)
=
∆k
2
+
α
∆k
v(θk)− [(1− δrk)v(θr(k)) + δrkv(θ`(k))]
(1− δrk)δrk
,
(27)
which is only a function of the distance between the policy represented by k and that
of its relevant neighbors, δrk∆k and δ
`
k∆k, and the campaign investment of k and its
relevant neighbors θr(k) and θ`(k). Thus given the identity of k’s relevant competitors for
(x, θ−k), the vote share mapping mk(θk; θ−k, x) is differentiable at θk ≥ θk(θ−k, x), and
the marginal vote share is given by
∂mk
∂θk
= αv′(θk)
(
1
∆rk
+
1
∆`k
)
=
α
δrk(1− δrk)∆Tk
v′(θk).
In particular, the marginal impact of campaigning on vote share given the identity of
k’s relevant competitors is well defined, and increases the larger is α, the smaller is ∆k
and – given ∆k – the larger is |δrk − 1/2|. Generically, however, mk(θk; θ−k, x) will not be
differentiable at all (θk; θ−k, x). To see why this is the case note that
∂x˜kn
∂θk
=
α
xn − xk v
′(θk) >
α
xm − xk v
′(θk) =
∂x˜km
∂θk
whenever xm > xn. Since parties k and n are closer substitutes for voters than parties k
and m, an increase in θk has a larger impact in how the electorate divides among k and
n than in how the electorate divides between k and m. We have then two possibilities. If
k’s relevant competitor at θk is m, then n will not be the relevant competitor at θ
′
k > θk,
and in this case there are no discontinuities in the marginal vote share. But if n is k’s
relevant competitor at θk, then it is possible that for sufficiently high θ
′
k, m becomes k’s
relevant competitor, “squeezing” n. In this case, the change in the identity of the relevant
competitor rk(θ, x) forces an (upward) jump in ∆
r
k(θ, x) ≡ xr(k) − xk, and therefore a
downward jump in ∂mk/∂θk (see Figure 1 below).
It is apparent from Figure 1 that relying on the first order condition and a (local)
second order condition can potentially be very misleading. To see this, consider k’s best
response from this first order approach, which is given by
θk = Ψ
−1
(
δrk(1− δrk)∆Tk
α
)
. (28)
Now suppose that xk → xk+1. Then δrk → 0, and (28) implies that, unless the cost of
campaigning increases very sharply, θk will eventually hit its upper bound. This logic,
however, is not necessarily correct. While k and k+1 are close substitutes, and therefore
voters who rank k and k + 1 highest are very sensitive to differences in campaigning
among these candidates, the “local market” can very well be small. In this case, while k’s
marginal vote share can be very high for a small interval of θk, it will then drops to a much
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Figure 1: k’s Vote Share and Marginal Vote Share.
smaller level as soon as k’s relevant competitor changes from k + 1 to the more distant
k + 2, a much worst substitute to k in the eyes of voters. This is illustrated in Figure
2, which shows that in this example the second discontinuity of the marginal vote share
function would hit earlier than the intersection with the marginal cost schedule. Hence,
the intersection of marginal cost and marginal vote share would be at a lower θk than in
the absence of discontinuities. Under some conditions, however, the action identified as
Figure 2: k’s Marginal Vote Share and Marginal Cost of Campaigning (MC).
optimal by the first order condition will indeed be a best response. Consider for example
the case of interior equilibria with two parties running for office (Proposition 1). In
this case the identity of the relevant competitor is fixed by construction and therefore
for any given θ2, 1’s vote share mapping m1(θ1; θ2, x) has two kinks, one at t such that
m1(t; θ2, x) ≡ 0 and one at t such that m1(t; θ2, x) ≡ 1. In fact t = v−1 (v(θ2)−∆2/α) <
θ2 and t = v
−1 (v(θ2) + ∆(1−∆)/α) > θ2. Thus marginal rent is well defined, continuous
and decreasing at all points θ1 ∈ (t, t). Since the first order conditions for 1 and 2 imply
θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 = θ
∗, the kinks are not relevant. The same result holds for all location-symmetric
(LS) electoral equilibria as we show in Lemma 1.
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